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INTRODUCTION
Sexual abuse is denounced by society. Sexual predators' feed upon
the vulnerabilities of the weakest in society. These predators can operate
in any social classification or situation, including those developed and
SAssistant Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School; J.D., Harvard Law
School, 1993; A.B., Princeton University, 1990. I appreciate the encouragement and
insightful comments of colleagues generous with their time: Janet Findlater, Maurice
Kelman, Jessica Litman, Joan Mahoney, Lawrence Mann, Robert Sedler and Jona-
than Weinberg.
1. See CANDACE R. BENYEI, UNDERSTANDING CLERGY MISCONDUCT IN RELIGIOUS SYS-
TEMS: SCAPEGOATING, FAMILY SECRETS, AND THE ABUSE OF POWER 65-70 (1998)
(identifying five broad types of sexual predators: pedophiles, persons with other
paraphilias, sexual addicts, predators, and situational abusers); see also Stephen B.
Levine et al., Professionals Who Sexually Offend: Evaluation Procedures and Preliminary
Findings, 20 J. SEx & MARITAL THERA"Y 288 (1994) (stating that in a study includ-
ing a preponderance of male clergy, professionals who sexually offend are most often
diagnosed with paraphilia and sexual compulsivity and addictive behavior).
2. "[A]ll sexual misconduct occurs because a differential exists between the perpetrator
and victim, whether or not the situation is one of harassment or one of outright
abuse. This power imbalance may be one of status, vested authority, hierarchy, age,
gender, or physical strength." BENYEi, supra note 1, at 65.
3. See Barbara K. Schwartz, Characteristics and Typologies of Sex Offenders, in THE SEX
OFFENDER: CORRECTIONS, TREATMENT AND LEGAL PRACTICE 3-6-3-21 (Barbara
K. Schwartz & Henry R. Cellini eds., 1995); GORDON C. NAGAYAMA-HALL,
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nurtured by religious institutions. Addressing the problem of sexual mis-
conduct by clerics5 within religious institutions has complications in
addition to those within general society. However, it is not surprising that
general complications arise from the overall fabric of society and a long
history of subordination of those in weak positions. Sexual misconduct by
clergy is an instance of this perpetual dynamic. The difficulties specific to
addressing sexual abuse within religious institutions stem from the con-
stitutional restrictions on the manner and intensity with which the state
may interact with religion and religious organizations.6
The claims of sexual misconduct or abusei by clergy asserted by
THEORY-BASED ASSESSMENT, TREATMENT, AND PREVENTION OF SEXUAL AGGRESSION
3 (1996) ("Often the perpetrators are pillars of society, including clergy, police,
teachers, and physicians.").
4. See generally BENYEI, supra note 1.
5. Clergy, cleric and pastor are used more or less interchangeably. In this article, these
terms are intended to mean persons "who by ordination, licensing, or other form of
entitlement, as recognized and practiced by the religious group or sect with whom the
person is affiliated, is empowered to provide pastoral care and counseling to group
members and others seeking such guidance." John F. Wagner Jr., Annotation, Cause
of Action for Clergy Malpractice, 75 A.L.R4th 751 (1989) (citing Seeing a Mirror
Dimly? Clergy Malpractice as a Cause ofAction: Nally v. Grace Community Church, 15
CAP. U. L. REV. 349 (1986)). In no way are these terms intended to be exclusive to
any one religion, denomination or sect as the problem of clergy sexual misconduct is
not isolated or limited to any particular religion or sect.
The sexual misconduct of spiritual leaders is not confined to any one de-
nomination or religious faith. North American Christians, Jews, Buddhists,
Sufis, and Hindus have all experienced boundary violations of this sort in
their families of faith. Partially this is the result of personal psychology
combined with authoritarian forms of social structuring.... Always, how-
ever, sexual misconduct is a rupture of the covenant of trust between
clergperson and congregant.
BENYEi, supra note 1, at 59 (emphasis added).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also infla Part III.
7. Ann-Janine Morey, Blaming Women for the Sexually Abusive Male Pastor, The Chris-
tian Century, Oct. 5, 1988, at 866 ("[A] male pastor's sexual advances toward a
woman that occur while he performs his professional duties are better understood as
'sexual abuse,' [which] ... assumes that a person has used personal, social or physical
power to coerce sexual intimacy."); see also Janice D. Villiers, Clergy Malpractice Re-
visited. Liability for Sexual Misconduct in the Counseling Relationship, 74 DENY. U. L.
REV. 1, 3 (1996); Pamela Cooper-White, Soul Stealing: Power Relations in Pastoral
SexualAbuse, The Christian Century, February 20, 1991, at 196 (identifying pas-
tor/parishioner sexual relations as "sexual abuse" because of the power and control
inherent to the relationship).
8. The underlying premise in this article is a male clergy and female victim. This reflects
the "vast preponderance of these cases." Cooper-White, supra note 7, at 197; NA-
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adult9 members of religious congregations generally have been dealt with
under theories of clergy malpractice. Clergy malpractice first received
measurable scholarly attention with the case of Nally v. Grace,' where
the cause of action initially appeared." In Nally, the parents of a
GAYAMA-HALL, supra note 3, at 11. That is not to suggest that sexual abuse by a same-
gendered adult does not also constitute an actionable breach of fiduciary duty and
warrant protection of the entrusting party, regardless of sexual orientation. See gener-
ally Walter H. Bera, Betrayak Clergy SexualAbuse and Male Survivors, in BREACH OF
TRUsT: SExuAL EXPLOITATION BY HALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS AND CLERGY 91
(John C. Gonsiorek ed., 1995) (discussing male victims in cluster sexual abuse by a
clergymember).
9. While we readily have sympathy and understanding for child victims of sexual abuse,
adults are often presumed to have caused their own victimization as observers choose
denial and reinterpretation of the cause and harms in order to reinforce "people's be-
lief in a just world." See P. Susan Penfold, Why Did You Keep Going for So Long?
Issues for Survivors of Long-Term, Sexually Abusive "Helping" Relationships, 24 J. SEX
ED. & THERAPY 244, 244-45 (1999).
"Most states automatically consider fifteen-year-olds too immature to consent to
sex, though a few might not be. In the same way, patients are best treated as incapa-
ble of giving valid, adequately informed consent to sex with their therapists, though
in rare cases they might not be." STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE
CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 223 (1998). However, does
not any permissible atmosphere enable abuse of both children and adults? Would not
enforcement as to adults also help ensure better protections for children and young
adults? What of children who appear to be adults, adults who appear to be children,
or children on the brink of adulthood? Consider the abuse that starts during child-
hood and proceeds into adulthood. E.g., Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (plaintiff alleged that cleric initiated sexual contact when she was
tvelve and continued to do so through adulthood); Erickson v. Christenson, 781
P.2d 383 (Or. App. 1989) (explaining cleric's abuse of parishioner started when pa-
rishioner was thirteen and lasted until she was approximately thirty years of age); see
abo Schwartz, supra note 3, at 3-25 (explaining that FBI typology for pedophiles in-
cludes the "morally indiscriminate," someone who chooses their victims based on
'vulnerability and opportunity and only coincidentally because they are children").
There should not be two different standards for children and adult victims. Preven-
tion requires consistency.
10. Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church of the Valley, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1987).
11. See, e.g., John H. Arnold, Clergy Sexual Malpractice, 8 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 25
(1996); Martin R. Bartel, Clergy Malpractice After Nally: "Touch Not My Anointed,
and to My Prophets Do No Harm" 35 VILL. L. REv. 535 (1990); Samuel E. Ericsson,
Clergyman Malpractice: Ramifications of a New Theory, 16 VAL. U. L. REv. 163
(1981); Carl H. Esbeck, Tort Claims Against Churches and Ecclesiastical Officers: The
FirstAmendment Considerations, 89 W. VA. L. RFv. 1 (1986); Constance Frisby Fain,
Clergy Malpractice: Liability for Negligent Counseling and Sexual Misconduct, 12 Miss.
C. L. Rav. 97 (1991); Sue Ganske Graziano, Clergy Malpractice, 12 WHITTIER L.
REv. 349 (1991); Randall K. Hanson, Clergy Malpractice: Suing Ministers, Pastors,
and Priests for Ungodly Counseling, 39 DRAKE L. Ray. 597 (1989-90); James T.
O'Reilly & JoAnn M. Strasser, Clergy Sexual Misconduct: Confronting the Difflcult
2001]
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twenty-four-year-old man brought a wrongful death action after their
son committed suicide. They alleged clergy malpractice, negligence, and
outrageous conduct 12 against the church and its pastor, who was in a
counseling relationship with their son. Nally focused primarily on the
negligent failure to prevent suicide.' 3 There were no allegations of sexual
abuse in Nally. Nonetheless, claims for sexual misconduct have since
been discussed under the rubric of clergy malpractice.
The controversy surrounding clergy malpractice heightened with
the cases of F. G. v. MacDonell 4 and Sanders v. Casa View Baptist
Church.5 These cases permitted claims for breach of fiduciary duty and
Constitutional and Institutional Liability Issues, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 31 (1994);
Mark A. Anthony, Comment, Through the Narrow Door: An Examination of Possible
Criteria for a Clergy Malpractice Action, 15 U. DAYTON L. REv. 493 (1990); Robert J.
Basil, Note, Clergy Malpractice: Taking Spiritual Counseling Conflicts Beyond Inten-
tional Tort Analysis, 19 RUTGERS L. J. 419 (1988); Lee W. Brooks, Note, Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress by Spiritual Counselors: Can Outrageous Conduct Be
'Free Exercise?, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1296 (1986); Margaret Ann Burton, Comment,
Nally v. Grace Community Church: Is There a Future for Clergy Malpractice Claims?,
37 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 467 (1997); Michael J. Fiorillo, Comment, Clergy Mal-
practice: Should Pennsylvania Recognize a Cause ofAction for Improper Counseling by a
Clergyman?, 92 DICK. L. REv. 223 (1987); C. Eric Funston, Note, Made Out of
Whole Cloth? A Constitutional Analysis of the Clergy Malpractice Concept, 19 CAL. W.
L. REv. 507 (1983); James K. Lehman, Note, Clergy Malpractice: A Constitutional
Approach, 41 S.C. L. Rev. 459 (1990); C. Grace McCaffrey, Note, Nally v. Grace
Community Church of the Valley: Clergy Malpractice-A Threat to Both Liberty and
Life, 11 PACE L. Rev. 137 (1990); Kelly Beers Rouse, Note, Clergy Malpractice
Claims: A New Problem for Religious Organizations, 16 N. Ky. L. Rev. 383 (1989);
Greg Slater, Note, Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley: Absolution for
Clergy Malpractice?, 1989 BYU L. Rev. 913 (1989); Mark Taylor, Note, Nally v.
Grace Community Church: The Future of Clergy Malpractice Under Content-Based
Analysis, 1990 UTAH L. Rev. 661 (1990).
12. While the trial court granted summary judgment for defendants on all counts, Nally,
240 Cal. Rptr. at 221-22, the decision was reversed on appeal. Plaintiffs appealed
from the nonsuit motion granted in the second trial. In the second appeal, the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals rejected the view that it had ever recognized a cause of action
for clergy malpractice: "In our view this case has little or nothing to say about the li-
ability of clergymen for the negligent performance of their ordinary ministerial duties
or even their counseling duties except when they enter into a counseling relationship
with suicidal individuals." Id. at 219.
13. Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948, 955 (Cal. 1998).
14. 696 A.2d 697, 702 (NJ. 1997) (determining that "[t]he First Amendment does not
insulate a member of the clergy from actions for breach of fiduciary duty arising out
of sexual misconduct").
15. 134 F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir. 1998) (determining that the Free Exercise Clause does
not protect the actions of a cleric who engaged in sexual relations with two separate
women in counseling relationships with him, and who breached his fiduciary duties
and committed professional malpractice as a marriage counselor).
[Vol. 8:45
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professional malpractice, respectively, in circumstances involving alleged
sexual misconduct in a counseling relationship with a cleric.1 6 In F. G.,
the plaintiff alleged that Rev. MacDonell, who was married at the time,
"engaged in sexual behavior with [her] inappropriate to and in violation
of [their year-long counseling relationship] . The court determined
that "the First Amendment does not insulate a member of the clergy
from actions for breach of fiduciary duty arising out of sexual miscon-
duct that occurs during a time when the clergy member is providing
counseling to a parishioner."18 The Court further determined that
breach of fiduciary duty claims can be resolved in this context. The
Court added that, "[b]ut for MacDonell's status as a clergyman, his
conduct was unrelated to religious doctrine."19
In Sanders, two separate plaintiffs claimed that their minister, while
providing marriage counseling to each, "encourag[ed] and consum-
mat[ed] a sexual relationship with each plaintiff."2 Each plaintiff had
initiated counseling upon the minister's invitation after he had
"represented that he was qualified by education and experience to pro-
vide marriage counseling."2' At trial, the jury found that even though
the minister sometimes discussed scripture in the counseling sessions,
the counseling he provided was "essentially secular" in nature.22 The
court determined that the First Amendment was not implicated
"because the duties underlying the plaintiffs' claims for malpractice by a
marriage counselor and breach of fiduciary duties [were] not derived
16. For scholarly discussions of F.G. and Sanders. see, for example, Paul A. Clark, Clergy
Malpractice After F.G. v. MacDonell and Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 22
Am. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 229 (1998); Julie Johnson, The Sanctuary Crumbles: The Future
of Clergy Malpractice in Michigan, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. Rav. 493 (1997); Yanet
Perez, Survey: Constitutional Law-Free Exercise Clause-Claim of Sexually Inappro-
priate Conduct by Clergyman During the Course of Pastoral Counseling, in Breach of the
Clergyman's Fiduciary Duty Owed Parishioner, Could Be Resolved by the Courts Without
Becoming Entangled in the Clergyman's Free Exercise of Religion-F.G. v. MacDonell,
28 SETON HALL L. REv. 712 (1997); Melissa A. Provost, Surveys: First Amendment-
Free Exercise Clause-Cleric Who Engaged in Sexual Acts While Providing Pastoral
Counseling to a Parishioner Can Be Held Liable for Breach of Fiduciary Duty--F.G. v.
MacDonell, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 625 (1998); Lindsey Rosen, Recent Decision:
Constitutional Law-In Bad Faith: Breach of Fiduciary Duty by the Clergy-F.G. v.
MacDonell, 71 TEMPLE L. Rav. 743 (1998); Villiers, supra note 7.
17. F.G., 696 A.2d at 700.
18. F.G., 696 A.2d at 702.
19. F.G., 696 A.2d at 566.
20. Sanders, 134 F.3d at 334.
21. Sanders, 134 F.3d at 334.
22. Sanders, 134 F.3d at 334.
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from religious doctrine."2' The court stated that "the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom cannot be construed to protect secular
beliefs and behavior, even when they comprise part of an otherwise re-
ligious relationship between a minister and a member of his or her
congregation. To hold otherwise would impermissibly place a religious
leader in a preferred position in our society."
24
Although these cases rejected attacks based on the First Amend-
ment, the more recent cases of Teadt v. Lutheran Church Missouri
Synod and Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese26 refused to permit any
form of redress, stating First Amendment rationales. The courts in both
cases chose not to distinguish between the cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty and that for clergy malpractice; furthermore, it was de-
termined that either cause of action would impermissibly entangle
27
courts in religious matters.
In Teadt, the minister initially took the role of pastoral counselor
to help the plaintiff cope with several personal difficulties, including
surgery on her lower back.28 At some later point during the counseling
relationship, the minister engaged in a sexual relationship with the
plaintiff.29 While the minister disputed the continuation of the relation-
ship, plaintiff contended that he "became involved in her life to the
extent that his financial and emotional assistance to her was in exchange
for sexual relations." 0 The court determined that "plaintiffs allegations
that [the pastor] misused his superior position as her pastor and coun-
selor in order to achieve a sexual relationship with her also reveal that
the gist of plaintiffs action is in fact clergy malpractice,"31 and such
claim would require defining a standard of care which would embroil
courts in religious practice and belief.
32
In Langford, the defendant monsignor began counseling plaintiff
when she was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis and "looked to God for
direction." 33 Plaintiff believed her subsequent remission from her illness
23. Sanders, 134 F.3d at 337.
24. Sanders, 134 F.3d at 337 (citing cf County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,
593-94 (1989) ("[I]nterpreting the First Amendment to preclude the state from fa-
voring religion over nonreligion.").
25. 603 N.W.2d 816 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
26. 705 N.Y.S.2d 661 (App. Div. 2000).
27. See Teadt, 603 N.W.2d at 823 (citing Langord, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 439).
28. Teadt, 603 N.W.2d at 818.
29. Teadt, 603 N.W.2d at 818.
30. Teadt, 603 N.W.2d at 818.
31. Teadt, 603 N.W.2d at 822.
32. Teadt, 603 N.W.2d at 822. See discussion infra pp. 35-72 and accompanying text.
33. Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 705 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (App. Div. 2000).
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was due to the monsignor's prayers." The counseling relationship
evolved into a sexual one to which plaintiff acquiesced to avoid the loss
of "her spiritual link and her 'best friend."' 35 Deciding that the grava-
men of the claim for breach of fiduciary duty was in fact one for clergy
malpractice, the judge refused adjudication of the matter as the claim,
characterized as either breach of fiduciary duty or clergy malpractice,
would entangle the court in "forbidden ecclesiastical terrain.
36
Several other courts have addressed the issue of clergy malpractice,
none explicitly recognizing it as a cause of action.37 Among these courts,
there is a split of authority regarding whether these actions are permissi-
ble under the First Amendment.3 The outcomes by the respective
jurisdictions are dependent on whether the court characterizes the claim
as one for breach of fiduciary duty or for malpractice.39
The constitutional tradition of avoiding governmental interference
with the practice of religion and simultaneous abhorrence for the estab-
lishment of state religion is an important consideration. 0 However, the
social objectives of minimizing, if not eliminating, sexually predatory
34. Langfrrd, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
35. Langford, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
36. Langord, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
37. See, e.g., Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425 (7th Cir. 1994); Isely v. Capuchin Province,
880 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Mich. 1995); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1997) (deciding that
clergy malpractice was an inappropriate form of relief for sexual misconduct); Moses
v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993); Schieffer v. Catholic Archdiocese,
508 N.V.2d 907 (Neb. 1993); Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1991); De-
stefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988) (en banc); Strock v. Pressnell, 527
N.E.2d 1235 (Ohio 1988); Handley v. Richards, 518 So. 2d 682 (Ala. 1987);
Amato v. Greenquist, 679 N.E.2d 446 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); Hester v. Barnett, 723
S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); see also Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 862
S.V.2d 338 (Mo. 1993) (en banc); Bladen v. First Presbyterian Church of Sallisaw,
857 P.2d 789 (Okla. 1993); Fontaine v. Roman Catholic Church of Archdiocese,
625 So. 2d 548 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Jones v. Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927 (Sup. Ct.
1992); EJ.M. v. Archdiocese of Phila., 622 A.2d 1388 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). But see
Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1998) (characterizing
the action as one for professional malpractice for marital counseling); Strock, 527
N.E.2d at 1245 (Sweeney, J., dissenting) ("[A] marriage counselor who engages in
sexual relations with the spouse of a client seeking professional guidance may be an-
swerable in damages for malpractice."); see also Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church of the
Valley, 763 P.2d 948, 960 (Cal. 1988) ("[lIt would certainly be impractical, and
quite possibly unconstitutional, to impose a duty of care on pastoral counselors.").
38. See discussion infra Part II.
39. See discussion infra Part I.
40. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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conduct is also very important, both as a general proposition and in the
context of church and state interaction. 1
Each person's right to believe as he wishes and to practice that
belief according to the dictates of his conscience so long as he
does not violate the personal rights of others, is fundamental to
42
our system.
When we examine the prohibition of sexual misconduct in the
context of religious institutions, there is no clash of objectives.43 If the
cause of action for sexual misconduct were properly conceptualized as a
malpractice claim, there may be First Amendment problems; however,
the First Amendment challenges should ultimately fail because mal-
practice is not the proper claim, as will be demonstrated in this article.
Courts' reticence in adjudicating matters where religion is even su-
perficially involved has permitted predators partial, if not total, shelter
from laws that ought to deter and limit their activities.4 It has also
41. See Esbeck, supra note 11, at 10 ("Unless citizens exercise their freedom responsibly
out of self-restraint, the coercive power of the state cannot recede into the back-
ground.").
42. Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 722 F.2d 1164, 1167 (4th
Cir. 1985) (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)) (emphasis added).
43. The assumption here is of traditional major religions in society today and does not,
nor could not, contemplate all potential beliefs or belief systems that may be in con-
flict with general social norms, mores or laws. However, though not generally
regarded as tenets of major modern-day religions, emphasis on sex in religion is far
from unheard of, including phallic worship in early cults. See J. GORDON MELTON,
MAGIC, WITCHCRAFT, AND PAGANISM: A BIBLIOGRAPHY 71 (1982) (citing examples
such as the Temple of Eulis founded in 1875 by Paschal Beverly Randolph, and the
karezza technique originating in the Oneida colony founded by John Humphrey
Noyes).
44. The United States has a long tradition of regulating sexual activity. See RICHARD A.
POSNER & KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, A GUIDE TO AMEIucA's SEx LAws (1996)
(containing a compendium of the nation's sex laws, including descriptions of laws
concerning public nudity and indecency, fornication, adultery, incest, bigamy, pros-
titution and rape). For a more analytic discussion, see DONALD E. J. MAcNAMARA
AND EDWARD SAGARIN, SEX, CRIME AND THE LAW (1977). However, some courts cite
the criminal law as a reason not to recognize a cause of action in tort. See, e.g.,
Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating as a reason not
to impose breach of fiduciary duty the "general duty to refrain from violating the pe-
nal laws stated"); Roppolo v. Moore, 644 So. 2d 206, 208 (La. Ct. App. 1994)
(citing lack of criminal prohibitions as reason for not holding priest accountable).
Nonetheless, at least one purpose of the tort system is to act as a means of deterrence,
supplementing the criminal law system in this effect. The criminal law does not ad-
dress every situation of moral culpability, nor could it. In addition, with the higher
evidentiary standard and burdens of proof, all culpable actors are not necessarily held
[Vol. 8:45
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meant that complete protections for victims of sexual abuse are not
available for those who are victimized in religious settings. By denying
these claims under the guise of constitutional prohibition, the constitu-
tional mandate intended to protect religion may be helping to establish
the church as a safe haven for malfeasors and thereby keep encouraging
them to gravitate to it. 45 This consequence is aided, in part, by religious
institutions themselves, through an institutional "instinct" of self-
protection. 6 Through a sense of institutional prerogative rooted in tra-
dition, religious institutions assert First Amendment claims, even where
undesired results, both socially, and perhaps, spiritually, occur.
accountable under the criminal justice system. Finally, the tort system is better
equipped to provide compensation and redress directly to victims of impermissible
conduct.
45. That is, a rational actor, who is predisposed to sexual misfeasance, would choose to
act in the confines of an institution where first amendment considerations will shield
him from responsibility. Preliminary findings of social science research indicate there
is at least some truth to this proposition. Some even suggest the problem is unknow-
able because of hiding and silencing of the problem. See infra note 209.
For an overview of the problem and a collection of statistics regarding clergy
sexual misconduct in the various sects, see O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 11, at 31-
36; Villiers, supra note 7, at 15 n.89; MARIE M. FORTUNE, Is NOTHING SACRED?:
THE STORY OF A PASTOR, THE WOMAN HE SEXUALLY ABUSED, AND THE CONGREGA-
TION HE NEARLY DESTROYED 82 (1999) ("We have no current data that reveals the
extent of this problem within the religious community.... However, there is no rea-
son to assume that the incidence among clergypersons is any less frequent than the
estimated 10-15% for other counseling professions."); Schwartz, supra note 3, at 3-4
("[A]pproximately 10% of clergy (mostly males) have been engaged in sexual malfea-
sance.") (quoting L. REDINGER, MINISTRY AND SEXUALITY: CASES, COUNSELING AND
CARE 279 (1990)). Much evidence is anecdotal and does not often come to court.
Those that do tend to be against the traditional religions, not new and alternative re-
ligions. See ELIZABETH PuTrICK, WOMEN IN NEW RELIGIONS: IN SEARCH OF
COMMUNITY, SEXUALITY AND SPIRITUAL POWER 50-55 (1997) (describing the most
infamous stories of sexual abuse by clergy).
46. All institutions want to avoid the costs of liability. However, given the stated pur-
poses and basic tenets of many religions, prevention of sexual misconduct and the
intendant psychological harm to the parishioner and congregation should also be a
goal. Avoiding responsibility may be a matter of credibility for many religions. See
FORTUNE, supra note 45, at 91:
Sexual contact by pastors and pastoral counselors in professional relation-
ships is a serious credibility issue for the church today. The unwillingness
of the church, by and large, to acknowledge this problem and to address it
directly results in a loss of credibility with its people. Hence some people
perceive the church, rightly or wrongly, as acting first to protect its own
(i.e., the pastors who act unethically in their pastoral role) from the conse-
quences of their behavior.
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This article argues that perpetrators of sexual misconduct should
not be granted refuge from the potential consequences of their actions
by mere affiliation with a religious institution. Part I of this article ex-
amines the theories of malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty, and
determines the appropriate cause of action for sexual misconduct and
ascertains their capacities to withstand First Amendment scrutiny. De-
termining the cause of action is essential to the evaluation of the
potential constitutional challenges. Part II demonstrates that sexual mis-
conduct by clergy is well outside First Amendment constraints. It
examines both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, and evalu-
ates the approaches of courts to the situation of clergy sexual
misconduct. Part II then compares the judicial treatment of sexual har-
assment by clergy under Title VII as guidance for treatment of sexual
misconduct by clergy. This Part also discusses a general theory of state
intervention in the affairs of religious organizations. This article con-
cludes with an application of the appropriate cause of action under tort
law within First Amendment constraints.
I. CHOOSING THE TORT DOCTRINE
Courts addressing a cause of action for clergy sexual misconduct
have discussed the matter as either an action for breach of fiduciary
duty47 or as clergy malpractice." Many of these courts suggest that the
two causes of action are in fact identical and should therefore be treated
47. Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 898 F. Supp. 1169, 1176 (N.D. Tex. 1995);
F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 700 (N.J. 1997); Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863
P.2d 310, 323 (Colo. 1993); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 284 (Colo.
1988); Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383, 386 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (rejecting
specifically that breach of fiduciary duty and clerical malpractice are the same cause of
action). Courts have recognized claims against clergymen for fraud, United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 (1944); sexual assault, Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Puhl,
354 N.W.2d 900, 901 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); sexual harassment, intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, and defamation, Guinn v. Church of Christ, 775 P.2d
766, 785-86 (Okla. 1989); unlawful imprisonment, Whitaker v. Sandford, 85 A.
399, 399 (Me. 1912); and alienation of affections, Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d
544, 555 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). But see Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 326
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); Bladen v. First Presbyterian Church, 857 P.2d 789, 796 (Okla.
1993); Schieffer v. Catholic Archdiocese, 508 N.W.2d 907, 912 (Neb. 1993); Strock
v. Presnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1243 (Ohio 1988); Teadt v. St. Johns Evangelical
Church, 603 N.W.2d 816, 823 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
48. Seesupra note 37.
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the same,4' that is, impermissible under the First Amendment because
they inquire into religious beliefs and practices.5" These courts do not
recognize the possibility of applying these doctrines in a neutral manner
because of the need for a relevant standard of care.5' When the courts
focus first on the incidental involvement of religion rather than focusing
on the factual nature of the claim and whether it is related to the practice
of religion, application of First Amendment principles is almost inevita-
ble.5
2
The problem of distinguishing. malpractice and breach of fiduciary
duty arises because the two actions have been treated as more or less
fungible and as actions to impose when no other action fits. The per-
ceived ill-defined status of these actions adds to the discomfort in
applying them in religious contexts.
A. Malpractice
When defined as a requirement to exercise the skill and knowledge
of members of the profession,53 an action for malpractice is incompati-
ble with the separation of church and state.54 In a general sense, clergy
malpractice has been defined as an action intended to remedy error in
49. See, e.g., Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1429 (7th Cir. 1994) ("T]he allegation of
fiduciary duty was simply an elliptical way to state a clergy malpractice claim .... );
Bladen, 857 P.2d at 796 "[Plaintiff's] fiduciary duty claim is merely another way of
alleging that the defendant grossly abused his pastoral role, that is, that he engaged in
malpractice."). But see Destefano, 763 P.2d at 284-85 (distinguishing breach of fidu-
ciary duty for sexual misconduct and malpractice for negligently performing
counseling duties); Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 705 N.Y.S.2d 661 (App.
Div. 2000) ("[A]ny breach of [defendant's] fiduciary duties can only be construed as
clergy malpractice, since it would clearly require a determination concerning
[defendant's] duties as a member of the clergy offering religious counseling to the
plaintiff."); Teadt, 603 N.W.2d at 822 ("[P]laintiff's allegations that [the cleric] mis-
used his superior position as her pastor and counselor in order to achieve a sexual
relationship with her also reveal that the gist of plaintiffs action is in fact clergy mal-
practice.").
50. The worry is that such a standard would require courts to identify the beliefs and
practices of the relevant religion and assess the clergy member's conduct. See Dausch,
52 F.3d at 1432; Schmidt, 779 F. Supp. at 328; Bladen, 857 P.2d at 797; Destefano,
763 P.2d at 290 (Quinn, C.J., specially concurring); Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church
of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948, 960 (Cal. 1988); Hester, 723 S.W.2d at 553.
51. See, e.g., Strock, 527 N.E.2d at 1239. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
52. See injfa pp. 37-40.
53. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 229A (1965).
54. See Esbeck, supra note 11, at 6.
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pastoral counsel or advice.55 It is not simply a theory of ordinary negli-
gence, but one directed at the cleric's professional activity. Where it is
necessary to examine standards of the profession of bona fide religious
counseling to establish the breach, the claim should not be permitted.56
Thus, as in the case of Nally v. Grace or similar situations,5 7 inquiry into
religious doctrine or standards of religious counseling are inappropriate."
55. SeeFunston, supranote 11, at 511.
56. See infra note 136.
57. Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988); see also Rop-
polo v. Moore, 644 So.2d 206 (La. App. 1994) (explaining allegations of adulterous
affair with priest prior to suicide of plaintiffs wife does not justify inquiry into the
practices, conduct or duties of cleric).
58. Courts may not assess the validity of religious belief or practice. United States v. Bal-
lard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-88 (1944); see also Esbeck, supra note 11, at 7 ("[A] balance
must be struck between the needs of the religious community and the protection of
citizens from tortious injury, even when these individuals voluntarily connected
themselves with the church they now wish to sue.").
Some commentators have suggested possible "standards of care" to be applied to
general clergy malpractice claims: 1) a secular standard. This standard employs the
position that pastoral counseling is separable from other more obviously religious
finctions. See Burton, supra note 11, at 472; Lawrence M. Burek, Note, Clergy Mal-
practice: Making Clergy Accountable To A Lower Power, 14 Pam'. L. Rav. 137, 152
(1986); Funston, supra note 11, at 514-17; Villiers, supra note 7, at 49-52; 2) a state
of the art standard. This standard urges that current secular psychological principles
and trends be applied. Burton, supra note 11, at 472; Ben Zion Bergman, Is the Cloth
Unraveling? A First Look at Clergy Malpractice, 9 SAN FERN. V. L. Rav. 47, 59
(1981); Burek, supra, at 153-54; 3) a denominationally specific standard of care. See
Funston, supra note 11, at 517-20. This standard of care would be specific to mem-
bers of a particular sect and the training within that community. See Burton, supra
note 11, at 472-73; Burek, supra note 58, at 152-53; Funston, supra note 11, at
520-24; 4) a neutral standard of care. To the extent a clergy member holds himself
out to be competent in counseling, he should be held to the duty imposed upon
skilled counselors. Burek, supra, at 150; Burton, supra note 11, at 473.
These standards are ultimately inapplicable to spiritual counseling because the
nature of the counseling cannot be separated into secular and spiritual. The basis for
many of these standards is either analogy or direct borrowing from the psychotherapy
professions. Of borrowing standards from mental health professions, Esbeck points
out that "both in theory and in practice, however, the 'cure of minds' and the
'healing of souls' does not segment so neatly." Supra note 11, at 83 (citing S. ER-
ICSSON, CLERGY MALPRACrCE: AN ILLEGAL THEORY 165-66, 171-72 (1986)). This
is because attempts to fashion a standard of care, generally or denominationally spe-
cific, would necessitate inquiry into religious standards, practices and beliefs. See
Esbeck, supra note 11, at 83 (discussing difficulty with standards of care choices).
However, where the cleric holds himself out to be skilled and experienced in coun-
seling and asserts that he has psychological training, he should be held to the secular
standards of care for the profession and for professional malpractice. See Sanders v.
Casa View Baptist Church, 898 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. Tex. 1995); Mullen v. Horton,
700 A.2d 1377 (Conn. App. 1997).
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In Nally, only purely spiritual counsel and advice regarding matters of
orthodoxy and religious tenets were offered. Nally is distinguishable from
a situation where a cleric exploits the confidential information and vulner-
abilities of a parishioner for personal satisfaction and gratification. Sexual
abuse is not spiritual counseling. It is neither merely careless nor irrespon-
sible. It is the use of a counseling position, under the guise of church
authority, to exploit another. It therefore need not be analyzed as coun-
seling or under the general rubrics of clergy malpractice.
Malpractice is an action based in either contract, implied or express,
or a consensual and fiduciary relationship.59 The composition and forma-
tion of malpractice are not dissimilar to breach of fiduciary duty."
However, professional malpractice is broader than breach of fiduciary
duty in that the relevant standard of care arises from the profession, not
just the independent relationship. In malpractice, courts are guided by a
standard forged and espoused by the profession over time. Conversely, in
breach of fiduciary duty, courts scrutinize an interpersonal relationship
where a specific duty to act for the benefit of another exists.6 Nonetheless,
though malpractice is per se negligence, there is no cause of action for
malpractice if there are no damages to the entrusting party.62 In most
59. 61 Am. Jur. 2d § 200 (discussing medical malpractice); Doe v. Roe, 681 N.E.2d
640, 649 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (explaining that "included within the rubric of legal
malpractice are claims grounded in breach of contract, negligence, and breach of fi-
duciary duty"); see also Burns v. Hanson, 734 A.2d 964, 970 (Conn. 1999)
(discussing the elements of medical malpractice); Preble v. Young, M.D., 999
S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (concerning medical malpractice); Klemme
v. Best, 941 S.W.2d 493, 495-96 (Mo. 1997) (discussing legal malpractice as a cause
of action separate from breach of fiduciary duty and citing Donohue v. Shughart,
Thomas & Kilroy, 900 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Mo. 1995) (en banc)).
60. See infra pp. 22-45.
61. See Joyce v. Garnas, 983 P.2d 369 (Mont. 1999) (citing Kilpatrick v. viley, Rein &
Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)) ("Legal malpractice based on
negligence concerns violations of standard of care; whereas, legal malpractice based on
breach of fiduciary duty concerns violations of a standard of conduct."); see also
Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 321 n.13 (Colo. 1993) (explaining that
the fundamental difference between breach of fiduciary duty and clergy malpractice is
"the former is a breach of trust and does not require a professional standard of care,
while the latter is an action for negligence based on a professional relationship and a
professional standard of care").
62. Malpractice relies on specific standards of care below which the practitioner should
not fall, but the claim is only effective if it has affected an individual with whom the
professional has a relationship and responsibility. Merely breaching professional stan-
dards is not actionable without a claimant. Thus, the distinction is more semantic
than real.
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cases, one might say that breach of fiduciary duty is a necessary compo-
nent of malpractice.
3
However, it is also possible to have a cause of action for malprac-
tice without a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty because it is
not necessarily a breach of fiduciary duty if the person in the fiduciary
position has not served his own interest in contravention of the other's,
and without damages to the entrusting party.6 Thus, it is possible to act
in the client's best interest while nonetheless breaching the customs of
other professionals in the field. Additionally, it is possible to abuse the
interests of the entrusting party without breaching professional stan-
dards, constituting breach of fiduciary duty alone. For example, a priest,
engaged in the counsel of a parishioner, who sells an entrusted, valuable
family heirloom of that parishioner, has breached a fiduciary duty. In
this situation, the parishioner should be entitled to rely on the trust en-
gendered in the relationship.
Since breach of fiduciary duty, as a general matter, is a subset and
component of malpractice, when the same operative facts support the
actions for malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty, the two claims are
identical. 65 Therefore, malpractice as the cause of action for sexual mis-
conduct in a counseling relationship should be considered permissible,
but only to the extent that it reflects breach of fiduciary duty.
B. Breach ofFiduciary Duty
The courts regard a trusting relationship as most worthy of
protection: "No Part of the jurisdiction of the Court is more
useful than that which it exercises in watching and controlling
transactions between persons standing in a relation of confi-
dence to each other." This "principle of humanity" exists for
the "preservation of mankind" and is to be guarded with a
63. A fiduciary duty exists as a matter of law between a professional and his client;
therefore, any professional malpractice claim includes a breach of fiduciary duty. See
Calhoun v. Rane, 599 N.E.2d 1318, 1321 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
64. Gerdes v. Estate of Cush, 953 F.2d 201, 204-05 (5th Cir. 1992); Resolution Trust
Corp. v. Accardo, 1994 WL 151081, at *4 (E.D. La. Apr. 6, 1994) (discussing legal
malpractice); Fed. Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Shelton, 789 F. Supp. 1360, 1366
(M.D. La. 1992).
65. See Majumdar v. Lurie, 653 N.E.2d 915, 920 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
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"jealousy almost invincible." It is necessarily "an inflexible
rule, and must be applied inexorably."
66
Breach of fiduciary duty is rarely discussed in depth or defined.67
Fiduciary duties originated in equity.68 They may be defined only
broadly, with the ability to conform to almost any situation. Breach of
fiduciary duty has been considered to be based in breach of contract,69
negligence, breach of trust, ° corporate law,' and fraud.72 Early in its
development, "fiduciary theory provided a remedy when injustice would
otherwise result." 73 Originally, fiduciaries were only trustees and banks. 74
66. Robert Flannigan, The Fiduciary Obligation, 9 OxFoRD J. LEGAL STUD. 285, 285
(1989) (citations omitted).
67. See Roy Ryden Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Jr., Ethics and the Law of Contract
Juxtaposed: A Jaundiced View of Professional Responsibility Considerations in the Attor-
ney-Client Relationship, 4 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHics 791, 792 n.14 (1991) ("Although
the concept of fiduciary relationship is well established in the law, it is surprising that
one finds little judicial discussion defining the relationship or discussing its etiology
and parameters."); see also Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fi-
duciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 879 (1985) ("Applicable in a variety of
contexts, and apparently developed through a jurisprudence of analogy rather than
principle, the fiduciary constraint on a party's discretion to pursue self-interest resists
tidy categorization.").
68. Demott, supra note 67, at 880-81; L. S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 C~a-
BRIDGE L.J. 69, 70 (1962).
69. See Anderson & Steele, supra note 67, at 792; DeMott, supra note 67, at 879-80
(discussing the ways contract principles have been used to describe fiduciary obliga-
tions).
70. See Sealy, supra note 68, at 71-72 ("The word fiduciary... was adopted to describe
these situations which fell short of the now strictly-defined trust.").
71. See DeMott, supra note 67, at 915-24.
72. Both malpractice and its subset, breach of fiduciary duty, arose in part from forms of
contract and trust. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874 cmt. a (1979); BOGERT,
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 2d § 481 (1978); Restatement (Second) of Trusts % 170,
174 (1979); Restatement, Contracts § 472, cmt. c (1932). The blurry line between
contract and tort is often noted. In 1974, Professor Gilmore suggested that
"[c]ontract is being reabsorbed in the mainstream of tort." and that the similarity
between tort and contract damages was leaving no "viable distinction between liabil-
ity in contract and liability in tort." Gar GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CoNTRAcT 87,
88 (1974). To the extent we view the operation of contract law as more neutral, it is
perhaps a false distinction. See generally Eileen A. Scallen, Promises Broken vs. Promises
Betrayed. Metaphor, Analog, and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv.
897 (discussing the evolution of fiduciary law as a combination of contract and tort).
73. STEPHEN B. BISBING, ET AL., SEXUAL ABUSE BY PROFESSIONALS: A LEGAL GUIDE 11
(1995).
74. See Anderson & Steele, supra note 67, at 792 ("Historically, certain personal and
professional relationships, such as trustee and beneficiary, corporate director and the
corporate entity, and attorney and client, have been treated as fiduciary in nature.")
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The law of fiduciary relationships then developed by analogy to laws
governing trustees' administration of estates and trusts. 75 The term later
broadened to include more than trusts,76 to include physician and pa-
tient and even minister and parishioner. 77 It has been extended so far as
to cover informal relationships.78
Broadly stated, a fiduciary relationship is one founded upon
trust or confidence reposed by one person in the integrity and
fidelity of another. It is said that the relationship exists in all
cases in which influence has been acquired and abused, in
which confidence has been reposed and betrayed. The rule
The traditional categories for fiduciaries are generally regarded as trustee to benefici-
ary, guardian to ward, agent to principal, attorney to client, executor to legatees,
partner to partner, corporate directors and officers to the corporation and sharehold-
ers, receiver to the court and the distributees and bailee to bailor; see also Tamar
Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REv. 795, 795-96 (1983); Austin Scott, The Fi-
duciaryPrinciple, 317 CAL. L. REv. 539, 541 (1949).
75. BISBING, supra note 73, at 5 (citing Duke of Beufort v. Berry, 1 0. Wins. 703, 704-
05 (1721) (holding guardians of infant to be trustees)); see also Klemme v. Best, 941
S.V.2d 493, 495-96 (Mo. 1997) (comparing breach of fiduciary duty to construc-
tive fraud and citing Johnson v. Smith's Administrator, 27 Mo. 591, 592-93 (Mo.
1859) and Swon v. Huddleston, 282 S.W.2d 18, 25-26 (Mo. 1955)); Anderson &
Steele, supra note 67, at 793; Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., judicial Review of Fiduciary De-
cisionmaking-Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1985).
76. See BISBING, supra note 73, at 30 (discussing "fiduciary at law" status compared to
fiduciary in fact). Likening "fiduciary at law" to malpractice, courts have found fidu-
ciary relationships between doctors and other health care professionals, including
psychiatrists and psychotherapists and their patients. See, e.g., Estate of McRae, 522
So. 2d 731 (Miss. 1988) (finding physician-patient relationship fiduciary); Mazza v.
Huffaker, 300 S.E.2d 833 (N.C. 1983) (finding psychiatrist-patient relationship fi-
duciary); Hodge v. Shea, 168 S.E.2d 82 (S.C. 1969) (finding psychiatrist-patient
relationship fiduciary); In re Corse's Estate, 182 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1958) (finding nurse-
patient relationship fiduciary). Janice Villiers suggests the clergy/counselee relation-
ship should be deemed fiduciary at law because of the nature of the relationship, the
power imbalance between the parties, and the paucity of alternatives for the trusting
parry. Villiers, supra note 7, at 42.
77. See Guill v. Wolpert, 218 N.W.2d 224, 228 (Neb. 1974); In re Harderode's Estate,
148 N.W. 774, 777 (Mich. 1914); Anderson & Steele, supra note 67, at 792 (citing
Ross v. Conway, 28 P. 178 (Kan. 1892); see also Seally, supra note 68, at 79 (citing
explicitly the priest-devotee relationship as included in several categories of fiduciary
relationship); Flannigan, supra note 66, at 298 (including confessor/penitent within
the category of fiduciary relationships).
78. While there may be some minor theoretical differences between the categories of
fiduciary, confidential, special and unconventional fiduciary relationships, I do not
find the distinctions significant or useful and treat them as synonymous. See Scallen,
supra note 72, at 906 n.3 1; Neil S.B. Schaumann, The Lender as Unconventional Fi-
duciary, 23 SETON HALL L. Ray. 21 (1992).
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embraces both technical fiduciary relations and those informal
relations which exist whenever one man trusts in, and relies
upon, another. Such a relationship might be found to exist, in
appropriate circumstances, between close friends or even
where confidence is based upon prior business dealings."
79. Penato v. George, 383 N.Y.S.2d 900, 904-05 (1976) (citations omitted); see also
Sanders, 898 F. Supp. at 1176; State ex rel Harris v. Gautier, 147 So. 240, 242 (Fla.
1933) ("The term 'fiduciary or confidential relations' is a very broad one, and em-
braces both technical fiduciary relations and those informal relations which exist
whenever one man trusts in or relies upon another."); Higgins v. Chicago Tide &
Trust Co., 143 N.E. 482, 484 (II1. 1924) ("A fiduciary relation, however, is not lim-
ited to cases of trustee and cestui que trust, guardian and ward, attorney and client, or
other recognized legal relations, but it exists in all cases in which influence has been
acquired and abused, in which confidence has been reposed and betrayed. The origin
of the confidence is immaterial. It may be moral, social, domestic, or merely personal.
If the confidence in fact exists, is reposed by the one party and accepted by the other,
the relation is fiduciary, and equity will regard dealings between the parties according
to the rules which apply to such relation."); Eldridge v. May, 150 A. 378, 379 (Me.
1930) ("The term 'fiduciary or confidential relation,' ... is a very broad one. It em-
braces both technical fiduciary relations and those informal relations which exist
whenever one man trusts in and relies upon another. The relations and duties in-
volved in it ... may be moral, social, domestic, or merely personal."); Warsofsky v.
Sherman, 93 N.E.2d 612, 615 (Mass. 1950); Adams v. Moore, 385 S.E.2d 799, 801
(N.C. Ct. App. 1989) ("[A] fiduciary relationship can be found to exist anytime one
person reposes a special confidence in another."); Di Maio v. State, 517 N.Y.S.2d
675, 678 (Ct. Cl. 1987) ("[A] fiduciary relationship is one founded upon trust or
confidence reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of another, and em-
braces both technical fiduciary relations and those informal relations which exist
when one man trusts in and relies upon another."); BISBING, supra note 73, at 4
("Our thesis is that fiduciary duties should be imposed with respect to all dealings---
professional, financial, and personal-between patients or clients and certain profes-
sionals whose special skills induce the trust and reliance of patients and clients.");
BISBING, supra note 73, at 11 ("Fiduciary law did not limit itself to any restricted
formal relationships."); DeMott, supra note 67, at 891-92; Scallen, supra note 72, at
905:
The characterization of these [fiduciary] relationships as "traditional" ig-
nores the unequivocable fact that fiduciary law is a product of many
centuries of development .... [LIabeling anything as "traditional" has
unfortunate consequences, for the primary means of answering the ques-
tion whether an individual is a fiduciary is through analogizing the case at
hand to a "traditional" fiduciary.
Doubtless, there are many familiar and well recognized forms of fiduciary
relationships such as attorney and Client, trustee and beneficiary, physician
and patient, business partners, promoters or directors and a corporation,
and employer and employee. The relationship is not confined, however, to
these and similar situations, for the circumstances which may create a
20011
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER 6 LAW [
Fiduciary relationships have been found between family members,"
unmarried cohabitants,8" and business associates.82
Fiduciary duty is very fact specific to the relationship,83 not neces-
sarily categorically defined, and is dependent on the power imbalance,
trust bestowed, and on the injustice that would result without its appli-
cation.85 Fiduciary relationships are based on the "actual placing of trust
and confidence in fact by one party in another and a great disparity of
position and influence between the parties to the relation. 8 6 Because the
relationship encourages the divulging of intimate and personal infor-
mation, an inherently higher degree of trust is what makes it possible for
the fiduciary to gain an advantage at the beneficiary's expense. There-
fore, a fiduciary "is held to something stricter than the morals of the
marketplace. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive, is the standard of behavior."87 "A person in a fiduciary relation
to another is under a duty to act for the benefit of the other as to mat-
ters within the scope of the relation."88 Once the fiduciary relationship
fiduciary relationship are so varied that it would be unwise to attempt the
formulation of any comprehensive definition that could be uniformly
applied in every case.
(citations omitted.)
80. See, e.g., Swenson v. Wintercorn, 234 N.E.2d 91, 97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (finding
fiduciary relationship between niece and aging aunt); Ruebsamen v. Maddocks, 340
A.2d 31, 35-36 (Me. 1975) (finding fiduciary relationship between plaintiffs (wife
and her father) and defendant (husband)); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mallison, 354 P.2d
800, 802 (Or. 1960) (noting that the parental duty to protect a child's interests is of
a "fiducial character" and that "a parent is the natural guardian of his child... [and
a] guardian stands in a fiduciary relation to his ward").
81. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Rooney, 533 N.E.2d 1372, 1374 (Mass. 1989).
82. See, e.g., Cann v. Barry, 199 N.E. 905, 906-07 (Mass. 1936).
83. BISBING, supra note 73, at 125; DeMott, supra note 67, at 879 ("Recognition that
the law of fiduciary obligation is situation-specific should be the starting point for any
further analysis.").
84. "Fiduciary at law" evolved to impose fiduciary responsibilities on certain categories
automatically. See SEALY, supra note 68, at 70-72; BISBING, supra note 73, at 8-16.
85. BISBmNG, supra note 73, at 28.
86. Ruebsamen v. Maddocks, 340 A.2d 31, 35 (Me. 1975) (noting that status as fiduci-
ary is defined by external expectations); see also FLANNiGAN, supra note 66, at 302-03
(discussing the "dominating influence" of one person over another as characteristic of
the fiduciary relationship and the imprecise nature of the definition).
87. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928); see also DEMorr, supra note 67, at
882 ("The fiduciary's duties go beyond mere fairness and honesty; they oblige him to
act to further the beneficiary's best interests. The fiduciary must avoid acts that put
his interests in conflict with the beneficiary's.").
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b (1957).
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or professional context is established, the obligation extends not only to
that context, but also to other transactions between the parties."s
"The essence of a fiduciary relationship is that one party places
trust and confidence in another who is in a dominant or superior posi-
tion." '' A significant differential in power between the parties
conditions the potential for exploitation. 9' Other factors relevant in the
existence of a fiduciary relationship are whether one party is accustomed
to guidance by the other; whether one party has superior knowledge or
knows that the other relies upon him; and whether there is evidence that
one party was dominated by the other. 92 Eileen Scallen has analyzed
courts' willingness to extend fiduciary duties through various means,
such as:
(1) dependence or vulnerability by one party on the other,
that
(2) results in power being conferred on the other,
(3) such that the entrusting party is not able to protect itself
effectively,... and
89. 61 Am. Jur. 2d § 165 ("The peculiar duty of good faith and fair dealing of the physi-
cian with the patient, which arises out of the relation of trust and confidence which
exists between them, does not extend only to the professional obligation of the physi-
cian to his patient, but extends also to other transactions between patient and
physician.").
90. F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 703-04 (NJ. 1997).
91. See, e.g., F.G., 696 A.2d at 700 (noting that the pastor, aware of the congregant's
vulnerability, nonetheless induced her to engage in a sexual relationship).
92. Gregory B. Westfall, Note, "But I Know it When I See It" A Practical Framework for
Analysis and Argument of Informal Fiduciary Relationships, 23 TEx. TECH. L. REv.
835, 850 (1992) (discussing Texas law, and attempting to provide an analytic frame-
work for the existence of fiduciary relationships); see also Corcoran v. Land O'Lakes,
Inc., 39 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1154 (N.D. Iowa 1999); Oeltjenbrun v. CSA Investors,
Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1053 (N.D. Iowa 1998); Economy Roofing & Insulating
v. Zumaris, 538 N.W.2d 641, 647 (Iowa 1995); BENYEI, supra note 1, at 62
("[S]exual abuse always implies a power differential between the abused and the
abuser, the victim and the victimizer."); Cooper-White, supra note 7, at 196 (arguing
"such intimate relating is always an unethical boundary violation and that it is always
the pastor's responsibility to maintain appropriate boundaries"); FORTUNE, supra note
45, at 81 ("[Slexual contact by pastors or pastoral counselors with parishioners or di-
ents within a professional relationship is a violation of professional ethics that not
only undercuts an effective pastoral relationship but, also, is exploitative and abu-
sive."); Rev. Marie M. Fortune, Is Nothing Sacred? When Sex Invades the Pastoral
Relationship, in BREACH OF TRUST: SEXUAL EXPLOITATION BY HEALTH CARE PROFES-
SIONALS AND CLERGY 29, 32-34 (John C. Gonsiorek ed., 1995).
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(4) this entrustment has been solicited or accepted by the
party on which the fiduciary obligation is imposed. 93
Because of the status and presumed spiritual and worldly expertise
of the clergy, a congregant commonly experiences positive feelings to-
wards the cleric or holds him in high esteem without his having earned
that esteem. 94 Sexual exploitation at the time of transference, or "the
projection of feelings, thoughts and wishes onto [a counselor], who has
come to represent some person from the patient's past,"9" can occur in
any relationship, not just within that of psychotherapist-patient, 96 and is
outside the scope of pastoral counseling.97 Even though clerics may not
be trained to handle transference, nonetheless, they are or should be
aware of some emotional consequences to such actions. At the least, ob-
jectivity in the counseling task would be compromised. And, regardless
of how the relationship originated, fear of reprisals, both spiritual and
secular, would be ever-present if the relationship ended.98 The possibil-
ity of transference, combined with the act of seeking help and counsel
93. Scallen, supra note 72, at 922 (arriving at this flexible framework by analyzing case
law and critiquing other theories of fiduciary relations); see also Demott, supra note
67, at 915 (developing an instrumental theory: "the fiduciary obligation is a device
that enables the law to respond to a range of situations in which, for a variety of rea-
sons, one person's discretion ought to be controlled because of characteristics of that
person's relationship with another").
94. See BISBING, supra note 73, at 24.
95. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DicnoNARY 1473 (5th ed. 1982).
96. See Shirley Feldman-Summers, Sexual Contact in Fiduciary Relationships, in SExuAL
EXPLOITATION IN PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 193, 202 (Glen 0. Gabbard ed.,
1989):
Although transference is most often discussed in the context of psychother-
apy, theorists such as Becker... and Brenner, reason that it can occur with
any suitable target.... All that is required is an authority figure who bears
at least a symbolic resemblance to the actual or idealized other about whom
the client/patient/student has unconscious fantasies or unresolved conflicts.
97. See Funston, supra note 11, at 520 (defining the treatment of transference as an un-
conscious conflict, as opposed to a conflict of religious doctrine or belief); see also
Bladen v. First Presbyterian Church, 857 P.2d 789 (Okla. 1993) (explaining trans-
ference phenomenon generally relevant only to therapist-patient relationships where
treatment is predicated upon its handling).
98. Even though it is not appropriate to borrow standards of care from the psychotherapy
profession, much of their forms of conduct and prohibitions are relevant. "Other psy-
chotherapists have access to consultation on difficult situations, but many ministers
do not ever seek expert guidance in the matter of treating the women of their congre-
gations." Samuel L. Bradshaw, M.D., Ministers in Trouble: A Study of 140 Cases
Evaluated at the Menninger Foundation, 31 J. PAsroRAL CARE 230, 238 (1997)
(explaining results from one of the few empirical studies on ministers, evaluating 140
Protestant ministers between 1964 and 1972).
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bespeaks a certain level of vulnerability on the part of the congregant."9
Use of personal information to prey on a congregant's vulnerability in
order to seduce' 0 them is a breach of fiduciary trust.' 1 Preying on the
99. See BISBING, supra note 73, at 20; see also Linda M. Jorgenson, Sexual Boundary Vio-
lations: The Role of Legal Prohibitions, 24 J. SEx ED. & THERAPY 226, 227-28 (1999)
(identifying the presenting problem, one-sided revelations, idealization of the coun-
selor, and the stress of the process as factors creating the vulnerability of the
counselee).
100. Some courts have compared claims for sexual misconduct to the amatory or "heart
balm" actions. None have regarded the abolition of the amatory torts as precluding a
cause of action for sexual misconduct. See, e.g., Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275,
282 (Colo. 1988) (en banc); see also Esbeck, supra note 11, at 89 (pointing out that
states may choose to abolish such claims, but it is not required by the First Amend-
ment); Strock v. Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1240-44 (Ohio 1988) (holding that a
claim which includes elements of abolished actions does not preclude the claim);
Goldberg v. Musim, 427 P.2d 698, 701 (Colo. 1967); Teadt v. Lutheran Church
Mo. Synod, 603 N.V.2d 816, 821 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (determining that claim
of "seduction" was not essence of plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claim, but then
refusing to find a fiduciary relationship); Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 533 A.2d 1358,
1360 (Md. App. 1987); Cotton v. Kambly, 300 N.W.2d 627, 628 (Mich. Ct. App.
1980).
More interesting than the assertion that the abolition of the amatory torts pre-
cludes causes of action for sexual misconduct is that the continued existence of the
amatory torts likely would not have been viewed to be in contravention of the First
Amendment; it is only when women were entitled to bring claims on their own be-
half for wrongs done to themselves that redress has been substantially denied. See
Lund v. Caple, 675 P.2d 226, 231 (Wash. 1984); Wyman v. Wallace, 615 P.2d 452,
455 (Wash. 1980); Bladen, 857 P.2d at 796-97.
In searching for the appropriate cause of action, it is only surprising that solici-
tation was not asserted. One plaintiff suggested that a cleric's "financial and
emotional assistance to her was in exchange for sexual relations." Teadt, 603 N.W.2d
at 818.
101. Cf F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 700 (N.J. 1997) (explaining that fiduciary is
"a special duty of care not to engage in unethical and harmful behavior towards [the
plaintiff]") (quoting plaintiff's brief); Tante v. Herring, 453 S.E.2d 686, 687-88
(Ga. 1994) ("Tante was a fiduciary with regard to the confidential information pro-
vided him by his client just as he would have been a fiduciary with regard to money
or other property entrusted to him by a client."); Doe v. Roe, 781 N.E.2d 640, 650
(Ill. Ct. App. 1997) ("[A]n attorney simply cannot use information obtained in the
representation of a client to entice her into a sexual relationship that she otherwise
would not have engaged in and then claim that the relationship is purely personal or
that he has not breached his fiduciary duty."). In this context, the breach is that
much more egregious when false theology is used for its coercive power. See, e.g.,
Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409, 414 (2d
Cir. 1999) (describing where cleric induced boy to perform fellatio on him by telling
him that the act was a way to receive holy communion); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F.
Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (alleging Bishop invoked God as supporting his con-
duct); Teadt, 603 N.W.2d at 822; Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 705
N.Y.S.2d 661, 663 (App. Div. 2000) (explaining that after telling his parishioner
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vulnerabilities of someone for whom there is a fiduciary relationship is
only for the benefit of the predator.
Consent does not operate as a valid defense in such situations. That
society regards sexual relationships as private and beyond state regula-
tion 10 2 is irrelevant to whether the fiduciary duty has been breached. 3
However, the consensual nature of the association is part of what de-
fines a fiduciary relationship. Establishment of a fiduciary relationship
renders implied consent legally impossible.' It is worth pointing out
that consent between equals in an intimate context is qualitatively dif-
ferent from consent to sexual contact between fiduciary parties.0 5 Once
it is established that breach of fiduciary duty is the appropriate cause of
action for clergy sexual misconduct, whether independently or as a sin-
gle component of malpractice, it must be shown that breach of fiduciary
duty can be applied in a neutral manner.
While the clergy malpractice claim may require the develop-
ment of a "reasonable clergy" standard, the fiduciary duty
claim does not necessarily require such an inquiry inasmuch as
the standard to which a fiduciary is held is not that of a
'professional.' In other words, rather than being restricted to
that the vow of celibacy only prevented sexual intercourse, dergyman told her that
only his prayers were keeping her well and preventing her multiple sclerosis from re-
curring); ef SCHULHOFER, supra note 9, at 219 ("The easiest cases to condemn are
those in which the doctor gets the patient's consent by claiming that sexual contact
will serve a useful role in therapy.").
102. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
103. Consent is considered a defense only to intentional torts. See, e.g., Schieffer v. Catho-
lic Archdiocese, 508 N.V.2d 907, 910-11 (Neb. 1993) (discussing consent as a
defense to intentional infliction of emotional distress). Though the act of sexual in-
tercourse may be intentional, the use of personal information to coerce or prey on the
vulnerabilities of another comes under the rubric of negligence, to which consent
should not be considered a defense.
104. Cf SCHULHOFER, supra note 9, at 219 ("A sexual liaison between the patient and
therapist can arise in a variety of ways, but virtually all of them involve serious defects
in the patient's consent."); see also infJa Parr II.D.
105. See Fortune, supra note 92, at 32 ("Frequently, however, the parishioner/client has
sought pastoral care during a time of crisis and is very vulnerable."); C. Jacqueline
Bouhoutsos et al., Sexual Intimacy Between Psychotherapists and Patients, 14 PRoFFs-
SIONAL PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 185, 185 (1983) ("Seductiveness of
the patient is irrelevant, as therapist-patient sexuality is analogous to parent-child
sexuality. By that analogue, sexual intimacy between patient and therapist is not
viewed as a consensual act between adults."). But see Schieffer, 508 N.W.2d at 910-
11.
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consideration of standard of care to be followed by clergy per-
sons or other religious entities, a court or jury can, in some
circumstances measure a religious organization's or official's
conduct by preexisting secular standards of care to which all
fiduciaries are held.
106
The first step in dealing with the constitutional and other legal is-
sues is understanding that the issue is not an ecclesiastic one. 0 7 Certainly
sexual activity, and especially misconduct, are not products of religious
belief. 3 Characterizing the claim from its factual basis is essential. Oth-
erwise, the essence of the claim and the justice sought is obscured in the
mire of First Amendment jurisprudence.
II. CHURCH AND STATE
Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. 10
The Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses are intended to ad-
dress different aspects of religious practice. Nonetheless, the religion
clauses of the First Amendment are often confused or discussed simul-
taneously, as they are in some of the clergy sexual misconduct cases.
Some courts have found jurisdiction lacking because adjudication would
require interpreting church doctrine or deciding religious matters using
an Establishment Clause analysis. These courts express concern over
106. Martinelli, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 146.
107. Langfrrd, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 666 (Miller, J., dissenting) ("While a claim of clergy mal-
practice may require a court to examine ecclesiastical doctrine, a claim of breach of
fiduciary duty raises secular issues, which can be adjudicated using neutral principles
of law.") (citations omitted); Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of N.C. Conference of United
Methodist Church, 63 F. Supp. 2d 694, 713-14 (E.D.N.C. 1999) ("[A] court must
consider the nature of a particular dispute involving a religious defendant to deter-
mine whether the First Amendment bars its exercise of jurisdiction over that
dispute."); see also Bell v. Presbyterian Church, 126 F.3d 328, 331 (4th Cir. 1997)
(stating that a court must determine whether the dispute "is an ecclesiastical one
about 'discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or
law,' ... or whether it is a case in which [it] should hold religious organizations liable
in civil courts for 'purely secular disputes between third parties and a particular de-
fendant, albeit a religiously affiliated organization' ") (citations omitted).
108. See supra note 43.
109. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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excessive entanglement with church doctrine." ° Even so, Free Exercise
seems to be at the heart of courts' analyses in these cases.
This confusion potentially stems from two separate causes. First,
the Free Exercise cases address both the absolute prohibition of religious
conduct and the interference by the state with matters of church gov-
ernment. The rhetoric of avoiding interference with Free Exercise is very
similar to that of avoiding "entanglement" in Establishment Clause
analyses. So, despite the different purposes underlying the separate
Clauses, this rhetorical short-hand has been applied in both analyses."'
Second, courts' insistence on addressing the factual claims as ones for
malpractice necessitates a constitutional inquiry. With the proper con-
ceptualization of the cause of action appropriate to the factual situation
of sexual abuse, such an inquiry is unnecessary.
A. Free Exercise
With the decision in Employment Division v. Smith,112 it is dear
that the state may prohibit conduct through generally applicable laws as
long as such prohibitions are not specifically directed at religious prac-
tice."3 First Amendment exemption from a neutral law of general
applicability cannot be sought "on the ground that the law proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)." 4 The
objective of preventing sexual misconduct and exploitation is not directed,
nor should it be directed, at any one religion or only at religion.
Smith was controversial for its narrow view of Free Exercise, in that
"neutral, generally applicable laws" were said to be exempt from con-
stitutional scrutiny, even when they prohibit or substantially burden
110. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); cf H.1RB. v.
J.L.G., 913 S.W.2d 92, 99 (Mo. Cr. App. 1995) (explaining religion was foundation
of plaintiff's relationship with the defendant); Isley v. Capuchin Province, 880 F.
Supp. 1138, 1150 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (stating that "any inquiry into the decision of
who should be permitted to become or remain a priest necessarily would involve pro-
hibited excessive entanglement with religion").
111. It is also possible that because no valid assertion of belief is likely to be asserted in
these claims, precluding the need to determine free exercise, infra note 142, judges
have analyzed the issue under the Establishment Clause to protect mainstream, tradi-
tional churches from liability.
112. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
113. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-78; see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City
of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
114. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)).
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religious freedom."5 In addition, the Congressional enactment of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)16 heightened any such
controversy. Notwithstanding the controversial divide between Con-
gress in enacting the RFRA and the Supreme Court in overruling its
application to the states in City ofBoerne v. Flores,"7 it is not a substan-
tial burden to address the harms resulting from clergy sexual
misconduct. Protecting the vulnerable in our society from predatory
conduct is surely a valid justification for government or state action.
Indeed, interpretations of the Constitution that prevent causes of action
for sexual misconduct on Free Exercise grounds makes a mockery of
valid practices based upon sincerely held beliefs." 8
The Free Exercise Clause is intended to protect religious freedom" 9
but has never been interpreted as an absolute protection. 20 Smith was
115. See Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique ofCity of Boerne
v. Flores, 111 -Htv. L. REv. 153 (1997) (critiquing Smith, 494 U.S. 872); see also Mi-
chad W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Cm. L.
REv. 1109 (1990); James D. Gordon III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CtA.. L.
REv. 91 (1991); Richard K Sherwin, Rhetorical Pluralism and the Discourse Ideak
Countering Division of Employment v. Smith, A Parable of Pagans, Politics, and Majori-
tarian Rule, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 388 (1991).
116. 42 U.S.C. % 2000bb-2000bb4 (1994).
117. 521 U.S. 507 (1997); seegenerally McConnell, supra note 115.
118. Ironically, the Constitution has been interpreted to allow the prohibition of consensual
relations that are the essence of sincerely held religious belief and that have no demon-
strably deleterious effect on society. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)
(denying Mormons an exemption from federal law prohibiting polygamy); cf. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (denying exemption for the sacramental use of peyote); see generally Eliza-
beth Harmer-Dionne, Once a Peculiar People: Cognitive Dissonance and the Suppression of
Mormon Polgamy As a Case Study Negating the Belief-Action Distinction, 50 STA. L
REv. 1295 (1998). It has also been interpreted to allow sexual abuse to occur under
some interpretations of the First Amendment. Supra pp. 35-42.
119. For Supreme Court cases supporting the principle that churches should be able to de-
cide matters of church government, faith, and doctrine for themselves, see Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States & Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696, 708-15 (1976); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presby-
terian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 446-49 (1969); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of
Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 107 (1952); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic
Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728-29 (1871)
[hereinafter "the Kedroff line of cases"]; see also Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-
Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1167-68 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing Kedroffl; E.E.O.C. v.
Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing Church of the Lukumi Ba-
balu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-33 (1993) and Kedroffi.
120. See, e.g., Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of the N.C. Conference of the United Methodist
Church, 63 F. Supp. 2d 694, 702 (E.D.N.C. 1999) ("While the Free Exercise clause
protects religious beliefs and a church's management of its internal affairs, it does not
uniformly sanction all religious conduct, nor does it protect all actions taken within the
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substantially premised on the distinction between belief and conduct. 2'
The most broadly stated and widely cited statement concerning the
practical functioning of this constitutional mandate comes from Cant-
well v. Connecticut.
[Free Exercise] embraces two concepts,-freedom to believe
and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of
things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to
regulation for the protection of society.1
The division between belief and conduct 23 is justified because
even though some practices are the product of sincere religious
context of a religious environment."); see aho Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403
(1963) ("'[E]ven when the action [prompted by religious beliefs] is in accord with one's
religious convictions, [it] is not totally free from legislative restrictions.") (citations
omitted); Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) ("Conduct remains subject to
regulation for the protection of society.").
121. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-79 (1990).
122. Cantwel 310 U.S. at 303-04.
123. The history behind the writing of the Free Exercise Clause is instructive in its interpre-
tation, dividing belief and practice, speech and conduct:
The history of religious persecution gives the answer. Religion needed specific
protection because it was subject to attack from a separate quarter. It was of-
ten claimed that one was a heretic and guilty of blasphemy because he failed
to conform in mere belief or in support of prevailing institutions and theol-
ogy. It was to assure religious teaching as much freedom as secular discussion,
rather than to assure it greater license, that led to its separate statement.
Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 179 (1943) (Jackson, J., concurring in the result in
this case and dissenting in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)) (emphasis
added). Dissenting in Murdock, Justice Robert Jackson nonetheless shared his majority's
view that secular speech and religious speech enjoy a constitutional parity of protection.
He offered the explanation above for why the authors of the First Amendment saw fit to
spell out a protection for religious expression that is fully conferred by the general guar-
antee of freedom of speech. See also Smith, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 702 ("While the Free
Exercise clause protects religious beliefs and a church's management of its internal af-
fairs, it does not uniformly sanction all religious conduct, nor does it protect all actions
taken within the context of a religious environment."). '"Vhat properly motivates con-
stitutional solicitude for religious practices is their distinct vulnerability to
discrimination, not their distinct value; and what is called for, in turn, is protection
against discrimination, not privilege against legitimate governmental concerns." Christo-
pher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The
Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1245, 1248
(1994). For an in-depth discussion of the history behind the religion clauses, see Michael
W. McConnell, The Orgins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion,
103 HARv. L. Riv. 1409 (1990); Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage
ofReligiousLibeny, 137 U. PA. L. Rav. 1559 (1989).
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motivation,14 there are those deemed so banefll that the state cannot be
indifferent to them. In such cases, free exercise "can not [sic] let any
group ride rough-shod over others simply because their 'consciences' tell
them to do so." 5 To the extent we differentiate speech and conduct, we
accord speech the greater protections. 26 Even then, not all kinds of
speech are protected, not even under the guise of religion. 127 Surely the
First Amendment does not shield inappropriate sexual conduct, most
especially misconduct, coercion, or exploitation, even within a religious
setting, from the consequences of tort law.
28
Jones v. Wolf'29 was the first case to espouse the standard of
"neutral principles of law" for resolving disputes involving religion or
religious institutions. This standard acknowledges that avoidance of all
interactions of the state with religion is impractical and that, under the
First Amendment, states need not automatically accord deference to
religious authority, even where there is no doctrinal controversy.
The primary advantages of the neutral-principles approach are
that it is completely secular in operation, and yet flexible
enough to accommodate all forms of religious organization
and polity.... It thereby promises to free civil courts
124. For example, polygamy is considered an expression of deep seated religious convic-
tions for which there is an affirmative duty in order to avoid condemnation by God.
For this reason, some argue that the division between belief and conduct is wrong
and should not be a distinction. See Harmer-Dionne, supra note 118, at 1325; see also
Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 123; Marci A. Hamilton, The BeliefTConduct Paradigm
in the Supreme Court's Free Exercise Jurisprudence: A TheologicalAccount of the Failure
to Protect Religious Conduct, 54 O lo ST. L.J. 713, 770 (1993) (describing the Su-
preme Court's vision of the religious experience as one involving faith, not action).
But see Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy
and Same Sex-Marriage, 75 N.C. L. REv. 1501, 1618-19 (1997) (suggesting that the
relationship between marriage and a free democratic government justify same-sex
marriage while invalidating polygamy).
125. Douglas, 319 U.S. at 179.
126. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982).
127. Cantwel4 310 U.S. at 306 ("Nothing we have said is intended even remotely to imply
that, under the cloak of religion, persons may, with impunity, commit frauds upon
the public."); see also Esbeck, supra note 11, at 7 ("[Religious organizations'] activi-
ties, as opposed to beliefs, therefore, cannot be totally autonomous from the state
when it comes to matters of high order, such as health, safety, and public peace.").
128. See Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1134-35 (D. Mass.
1982) ("[Ihe free exercise clause of the First Amendment would not immunize it
from all common law causes of action alleging tortious activity.") (citing Turner v.
Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367, 371 (D.R.I. 1978)).
129. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
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completely from entanglement in questions of religious
doctrine, polity, and practice."
In Jones, which resolved a property dispute between newly divided
factions of a religious community, the Georgia courts were permitted to
use consideration of deeds, state statutes or other neutral principles of
law to resolve the dispute. 3'
Only ecclesiastical or theological questions'32 or questions which
challenge the formal judgments of hierarchical church tribunals 3 are
beyond the reach of civil determinations regarding the First Amend-
ment. In the matters of employment 34 and education in religious
settings,135 questions of theology are essential and generally considered
part of religious governance 136 and beyond evaluation by courts. None-
130. Jones, 443 U.S. at 603.
131. Jones, 443 U.S. at 602. The Court there said: "There can be little doubt about the
general authority of civil courts to resolve this question. The State has an obvious and
legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of [civil] disputes, and in providing a
civil forum where [they] can be determined conclusively." Id. (citing Presbyterian
Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445
(1969)) (discussing property dispute between religious factions). But see supra note
119.
132. Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 449.
133. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States & Canada v. Milivojevich,
426 U.S. 696, 733 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that the Kedroff line of
cases reinforces the rule that "the government may not displace the free religious
choices of its citizens by placing its weight behind a particular religious belief").
However, the Kedroff line of cases "do[es] not involve the court's exercise of jurisdic-
tion in cases involving neutral statutes ofgeneralapplication," but rather "involve[s] the
validity of state statutes specifically designed to address religious conflicts and the
propriety of judicial review of a church's faithfulness to its own internal regulations."
Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of the N.C. Conference of the United Methodist Church, 63
F. Supp. 2d 694, 709 (1994).
134. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929) ("[I]t is the
function of the church authorities to determine what the essential qualifications of a
chaplain are and whether the candidate possesses them."); Serbian Eastern Orthodox
Diocese, 426 U.S. 696. But see Drevlow v. Lutheran Church, Mo. Synod, 991 F.2d
468, 471 (1993) (concerning the circulation of false information relevant to em-
ployment, "[tjhe First Amendment does not shield employment decisions made by
religious organizations from civil court review, however, where the employment deci-
sions do not implicate religious beliefs, procedures, or law").
135. See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 506 (1979) (holding that schools
operated by church to teach both secular and religious subjects are not within the ju-
risdiction granted by the National Labor Relations Act); Dlaikan v. Roodbeen, 522
N.W.2d 719, 720 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that refusal of admission essen-
tially involves ecclesiastic policies).
136. See Kedroffv. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S.
94, 116 (1952) (stating that the Free Exercise Clause protects the ability of religious
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theless, even in these areas, courts have been willing to resolve disputes.
In other matters, generally considered purely secular, but nonetheless
having an impact on the practice of religion, the state has enforced laws.
Courts have adjudicated matters of property disputes, 3 7 breach of con-
tract,38  educational fimding, 39  employment disputes40  and sexual
harassment, 14' all involving religious institutions.
Courts need not dwell on matters of faith and doctrine because the
abuse of the power within the relationship necessary for the realization
of sexual abuse is unlikely to be the product of serious religious belief or
doctrine that would be compromised by the exercise of jurisdiction. 42
organizations "to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of
church government as vell as those of faith and doctrine"); Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas
Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 363 U.S. 190, 191 (1960).
137. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979); Carnes v. Smith, 222 S.E.2d 322,
328 (Ga. 1976) (awarding church property to United Methodist Church on the basis
of express trust provisions in favor of the general church found in the United Meth-
odist Church's Book of Discipline); see also Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 727
(1871) ("[W]henever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule,
custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to
which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as
final, and as binding on them."). However, as noted in Kedroff, while Watson
'contains a reference to the relations of church and state under our system of laws,
[it] was decided without depending upon prohibition of state interference with the
free exercise of religion." Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 115.
138. See, e.g., Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894
F.2d 1354, 1360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (allowing breach of contract action by minis-
ter against church indicating that the claim would not necessarily require an
impermissible inquiry into religious doctrine).
139. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct.
2530 (2000).
140. See, e.g., De Marco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 1993).
141. See infra note 187.
142. See, e.g., Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 284 (Colo. 1988) ("If the alleged
conduct of [the cleric] was dictated by his sincerely held religious beliefs or was con-
sistent with the practice of his religion, we would have to resolve a difficult first
amendment issue."); see also Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223
(1963) (stating that for a violation to exist, a coercive effect on the practice of religion
must be demonstrated); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) ("[T]o have
the protection of the Religion Clauses the claims must be rooted in religious belief.");
Smith, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 712 (noting that Methodist Church defendants did not
suggest that the church condones sexual harassment in any way).
The court must first determine "whether [an application of a particular law] and
the First Amendment necessarily collide in this case." Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of
Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1166 (4th Cir. 1985) (discussing the appli-
cation of Tide VII). This view is obviously based on the basic tenets of the five major
world religions. See also supra note 43.
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Even when the issue is one squarely within religious belief and practice,
the courts have upheld complete prohibitions on conduct in a variety of
contexts. Courts have adjudicated matters of conduct specific to a
particular religion, including civil identification,14 1 the wearing of
religious garb, 44 solicitation of new adherents, 4 1 war,"' the sacramental
use of controlled substances, 47 polygamy, 14 snake handling'49 and faith
healing. 50 Once the court determines the nature of the dispute
involving a religious defendant is a secular one,' 5' the court can resolve
the dispute through neutral principles of law.5 2 Sexual exploitation is a
secular matter that surely can be resolved using neutral principles of law.
Paradoxically, it is the victim's beliefs that created the vulnerability to which she
was subject, not that of the church or cleric:
But often because of the image of charismatic spiritual power that these
men have asserted and fostered, the women's terror is akin to actually being
cursed or damned. Sometimes this kind of threat is made explicit by the
abuser. Its power is dearly demonic in nature and intensity-victims fear
that their very souls will be stolen.
Cooper-White, supra note 7, at 199.
143. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (upholding law requiring Amish
to violate the tenets of their faith by participating in the social security system).
144. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 510 (1986) (upholding military dress
regulations that forbade the wearing of yarmulkes).
145. See Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 655-56
(1981) (upholding prohibition of peripatetic solicitation by members of Hare
Krishna sect practicing ritual "Sankirtan" on state fair grounds as an impartially ap-
plied restriction).
146. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462-63 (1971) (upholding government's
right to compel conscientious objectors to make war despite religious character of
their objections).
147. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
148. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
149. Lawson v. Commonwealth, 164 S.W.2d 972 (Ky. App. 1942); State ex rel Swan v.
Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975).
150. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 38 (1905) (upholding law compelling vac-
cination of children for communicable diseases and requiring emergency medical
treatment over parent's religious objections); Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d
852, 873 (Cal. 1988) (permitting prosecution for involuntary manslaughter and fel-
ony child endangerment of Christian Scientist parents who withheld conventional
medical treatment from critically ill child).
151. Bell v. Presbyterian Church, 126 F.3d 328, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing General
Council Fin. and Adm'n of the United Methodist Church v. Superior Ct. of Cal.,
439 U.S. 1355, 1373 (1978).
152. Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of the N.C. Conference of the United Methodist Church, 63
F. Supp. 2d 714 (E.D.N.C. 1999); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
514 (1997) ("[N]eutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to religious prac-
tices even when not supported by a compelling governmental interest."); Goodall v.
Stafford County Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168, 171 (4th Cir. 1995); Employment Div. v.
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B. Establishment Clause
The Establishment Clause, in contrast to the Free Exercise Clause,
is intended to prohibit the state from promoting or otherwise aiding
religion, or from favoring one religion over another.'53 As long as neu-
tral principles can be applied, as in the Free Exercise analysis, the
question of the state promoting any religion should not be an issue.
Holding clerics and their institutions responsible for their sexual mis-
conduct through general tort law is not in violation of the
Establishment Clause. In fact, non-application of tort principles where
they might otherwise apply may be more like Establishment, creating an
exception for religion. 54 Because the Establishment Clause deals
squarely with the promotion of religion, these cases of sexual miscon-
duct by clerics are more appropriately examined under the Free Exercise
Clause and its doctrines. Perhaps because Free Exercise is not a credibly
asserted issue,'55 courts addressing sexual misconduct by clergy instead
choose to address the Establishment Clause in order to avoid adjudica-
tion of the unseemly matter.
When courts address the matter of clerical sexual misconduct they
tend to address it perfunctorily, stating out of hand that determinations
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) ("mhe right of free exercise does not relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general appli-
cability on the ground that the law proscribes... conduct that his religion prescribes
.... '") (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (applying a strict approach of "compelling state
interest"); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(citing Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894
F.2d 1354, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 1990)); Smith, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 714-15; F.G. v.
MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 702 (N.J. 1997) (citing Elmora Hebrew Ctr. Inc. v.
Fishman, 593 A.2d 725 (N.J. 1991)); Welter v. Seton Hall Univ., 608 A.2d 206
(NJ. 1992).
153. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1946) (holding that such language prohibits
a state or the federal government from setting up a church; passing laws which aid
one, or all, religions; giving preference to one religion; or forcing belief or disbelief in
any religion).
154. See Shawna Meyer Eikenberry, Note, Thou Shalt Not Sue the Church: Denying Court
Access to Ministerial Employees, 74 IND. L.J. 269, 284-85 (1998); see also Smith, 63 F.
Supp. 2d at 716 n.18 (citing Eikenberry, supra note 154); Sanders v. Casa View
Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir. 1998) ("[The constitutional guarantee
of religious freedom cannot have construed to protect secular beliefs and behavior,
even when they compromise part of an otherwise religious relationship between a
minister and a member of his or her congregation. To hold otherwise would imper-
missibly place a religious leader in a preferred position in our society.").
155. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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in this area would require assessments of religious beliefs. Without giv-
ing clear reasons for their assessment or analyzing the specific conduct,
courts have made broad assertions about the nature of religious coun-
seling and have insisted that the appropriate cause of action is
malpractice. A common argument made by these courts is that they
would have to assess religious beliefs in order to determine whether the
cleric breached the appropriate standard of conduct. Relying on Lemon
v. Kurtzman,56 the case of Schmidt v. Bishop provided the most com-
monly cited reasons for not adjudicating plaintiffs' claims for sexual
misconduct in a counseling relationship:
It would be impossible for a court or jury to adjudicate a typi-
cal case of clergy malpractice, without first ascertaining
whether the cleric ... performed within the level of expertise
expected of a similar professional (the hypothetical
"reasonably prudent ... pastor"), following his calling, or
practicing his profession within the community. See Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 299A. As the California Supreme
Court has held in Nally v. 'Grace Community Church of the
Valley: "Because of the differing theological views espoused by
the myriad of religions in our state and practiced by church
members, it would certainly be impractical, and quite possibly
unconstitutional to impose a duty of care on pastoral counsel-
ors. Such a duty would necessarily be intertwined with the
religious philosophy of a particular denomination or ecclesias-
tical teachings of the religious entity."
157
Despite the pronouncement by these courts, what is not clear is
whether enforcing common law prohibitions against sexual misconduct
necessitates such evaluations. These opinions are not useful in deter-
mining the accuracy of this trend and perhaps reflect the difficulty of
sifting through the constitutional questions in this factual situation.
156. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
157. 779 F. Supp. 321, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (quoting Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church of
the Valley, 763 P.2d 948, 960 (Cal. 1988) and relying on Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614-
15). See Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1431 n.3 (7th Cir. 1994); Roppolo v.
Moore, 644 So. 2d 206 (La. Ct. App. 1994); Jones v. Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927, 929
(1992). See also Sanders v. Baucum, 929 F. Supp. 1028, 1037 (N.D. Tex. 1996);
Doe v. Evans, 718 So. 2d 286, 288 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Teadt v. Lutheran
Church Mo. Synod, 603 N.W.2d 816, 822 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); Langford v.
Roman Catholic Diocese, 705 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (App. Div. 2000); Strock v. Press-
nell, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1239 (Ohio 1988).
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Under the Lemon three-part test, 5s entanglement is measured by
"'character and purposes' of the institution affected, the nature of the
benefit or burden imposed, and the 'resulting ... authority."" 59 Relig-
ious institutions and their congregations would benefit16 from the
vigorous use of tort law to ferret out and deter sexual predators from
their midst. The burden would be no greater than that imposed on any
other individual who, or institution that, participates in a lawful and
functional society."'
The Lemon test may be perceived as slightly more problematic with
the application of tort law, as it has not completely succumbed to
codification as have other areas of the law. Nevertheless, statutes are
often based upon the common law and interpreted through its extensive
use.' In the context of sexual misconduct by a clergy member, the
question would be whether tort law and tort principles are neutral and
whether they could be applied as such in a religious context. The
application of tort law also may be viewed as generally problematic
because it tends to be based more on broad principles and standards of
158. The three-part test described in Lemon says:
(1) the statute must have a secular purpose;
(2) the principal or primary effect of the statute must be one that neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion; and
(3) the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with
religion.
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. In the context of clergy sexual misconduct, the first two
prongs are most easily met when: (1) the state has an interest in allowing private ac-
tions to aid in the prevention and redress of wrongs from certain conduct, such as
sexual abuse; (2) there would only be a neutral effect on religion as preventing sexual
abuse and exploitation is a general social goal. The third prong of the test is perhaps
the most difficult to assess.
159. Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1170 (4th
Cir. 1985) (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614-15); see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203, 232 (1997) (explaining that "the factors [the Court] use[s] to assess whether an
entanglement is 'excessive' [for purposes of the third prong] are similar to the factors
[it] use[s] to examine 'effect' [for purposes of the second]"); Bollard v. Soc'y of Jesus,
196 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Lemon).
160. See supra note 46.
161. Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 177 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("Mhe limits [of
free exercise] begin to operate whenever [religious] activities begin to affect or collide
with liberties of others or of the public.").
162. Four states have specifically codified prohibitions of sexual exploitation by therapists
that may be interpreted to include clergy. See CAL. CIV. CODE§ 43.93 (West 2000);
MiNN. STAT. § 148A.01 (West 1999); Tax. Crv. PRac. & REM. CODE§ 81.0001
(Vernon 1999); Wis. STAT. § 895.70 (West 2000). Two states have explicitly ex-
empted clergy and spiritual or religious counseling from similar statutes. See 740 ILL.
CoMp. STAT. 140/1 (West 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.41 (1998).
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care than bright-line rules. Neutral laws may be applied in controversies
involving religion.63 However, because tort law is more policy-oriented,
based primarily on broad principles and standards of care, its neutral
application may be suspect in the application of some tort doctrines.'6
"Neutrality" may, in fact, be more difficult to achieve because of the
nature of standards of care essential in many torts,'65 including
malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. Nonetheless, a case can be
made that standards of care are, in their conceptualization, neutral.66
163. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
164. Intentional torts in the context of religion have not been problematic. See, e.g., Gal-
lon v. House of Good Shepherd, 122 N.W. 631 (Mich. 1909) (false imprisonment
claim); Conway v. Carpenter, 30 N.Y.S. 315 (1894) (claim for assault and battery by
pastor forcibly ejected by congregation). As in strict liability, no standards of care are
required for intentional torts, which may account for the difference in perception.
Nonetheless, negligence causes of action have been recognized in religious contexts as
well. In fact, cases recognizing an action for negligent supervision of ministers for in-
appropriate sexual behavior include Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic
Diocesan Corp., 10 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D. Conn. 1998); Nutt v. Norwich Roman
Catholic Diocese, 921 F. Supp. 66 (D. Conn. 1995); Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863
P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993).
165. See, e.g., Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 553 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (citation
omitted):
[A] theory of malpractice is defined in terms of the duty to act with that
degree of skill and learning ordinarily used in the same or similar circum-
stances by members of that profession.... It is a theory of tort, therefore,
which presupposes that every cleric owes the same duty of care, whatever
the religious order which granted ordination, or the cleric serves, or the be-
liefs espoused. It is a theory of tort, moreover, which inevitably involves the
court in a judgment of the competence, training, methods and content of
the pastoral function in order to determine whether the cleric breached the
duty... Thus, the question ... is whether pastoral counseling is so ine-
luctably a function of the particular religion that no one definition of its
malpractice can evolve into a standard of professional performance, and is
otherwise so purely sacerdotal a function, that is both unfeasible as a theory
of tort and not constitutionally permissible.
See also BISBING, supra note 73, at 281-82. But see Smith v. O'Connell, 986 F. Supp.
73, 78 (D.R.I. 1997) ("Here, there is no indication that the reasonably prudent per-
son standard established by tort law and the requirements of Roman Catholic
doctrine are incompatible.").
166. Certainly, the development of tort law was independent of religious considerations
and in no instance is directed at religion or religious doctrines. See Smith v. Raleigh
Dist. of the N.C. Conference of the United Methodist Church, 63 F. Supp. 614,
715 (E.D.N.C. 1999); see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law, in 3 THE
COLLECTED WORKS Of: JusTIc HOLMES 109, 154 (Sheldon M. Novick, ed. 1995)
(discussing the intention of the reasonable person as a "general" standard of conduct
"which every one may fairly expect and demand from every other"). Traditional tort
doctrine is approached from an objective rather than subjective perspective, adding to
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Carl Esbeck demonstrates the constitutional problems with certain
tort claims against the church, yet categorically exempts "seduction and
child molestation." 67 "Because no credible argument can be made that
such conduct is even 'arguably religious,' or caused by the promptings
of spiritual duty, these torts are not shielded by protestations of religious
liberty."16  Since such activity is not, and should not be, considered
spiritual or a matter of religious doctrine, First Amendment concerns
need not be applied.
69
By allowing such claims, there is no judicial entanglement
whatsoever in the relationship between diocese and priest or in
other spiritual matters, and the church can hardly be expected
to maintain that its priests are supposed to conduct themselves
in this manner toward parishioners as a matter of religious
doctrine and practice."7
In addition, professional standards are not established wholly and
independently by customs of the profession. Ethics of any profession in
the first instance comply with the law and with general social mores.
171
its neutral stance. See generally Fleming James, Jr., The Qualities of the Reasonable
Man in Negligence Cases, 16 Mo. L. RE. 1 (1951). Very few variations in personal
characteristics are accounted. Just as we do not take account of mature age, gender or
race, nor should we account for religious belief, nor evaluate it in applying standards
of care. See Holmes, supra, at 170 ("[T]he law takes no account of the infinite varie-
ties of temperament, intellect, and education which make the internal character of a
given act so different in different men.").
167. Esbeck, supra note 11, at 87.
168. Esbeck, supra note 11, at 87 ("Few would have the hardihood to claim first amend-
ment immunity in defense of a suit charging a rabbi, priest, or pastor with sexual
improprieties involving others connected with the church.").
169. See Esbeck, supra note 11, at 88 ("But in the case of sexual seduction or child moles-
tation, the standards of care in the law of torts need not depend upon or look to the
duties of priests as defined by the diocese."); see also Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d
275, 284 (Colo. 1988) ("When the alleged wrongdoing of a cleric dearly falls outside
the beliefs and doctrine of his religion, he cannot avail himself of the protection af-
forded by the first amendment."); Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir.
1997) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)) ("In order to establish a free
exercise violation [plaintiff] must show the defendants burdened the practice of his
religion, by preventing him from engaging in conduct mandated by his faith, without
any justification reasonably related to legitimate ... interests.").
170. Esbeck, supra note 11, at 89.
171. General ethics in some religious organizations includes avoidance of sexual contact
with clients. See Gary Richard Schoener, Employer/Supervisor Liability and Risk
Management: An Administrator's View, in BREAcH OF TRusT: SExuAL EXPLOITATION
BY HEALTH CaRE PROFESSION.LS AND CLERGY 300-03, 310 (John C. Gonsiorek ed.,
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The state has always felt free to regulate sexual conduct, and even more
so misconduct, regardless of particularized religious beliefs.
72
At the least, tort law is neutral to the extent that it is designed nei-
ther to suppress religious practices nor selectively to burden religiously
inspired conduct. 73 In fact, it is clear that tort doctrines have evolved
without regard to religious practices and are uniformly applicable
whether or not the conduct is religiously inspired.'74
Where evaluating the conduct of individuals 75 within a religious
institution and the general governance of such an institution would give
rise to serious constitutional questions,' 76 courts must not avoid those
questions by mechanical refusal to apply laws applicable in other con-
177texts.
Not all entanglements, of course, have the effect of advancing
or inhibiting religion. Interaction between church and state is
inevitable, ... and we have always tolerated some level of in-
volvement between the two. Entanglement must be 'excessive'
before it runs afoul of the Establishment Clause. 178
1995) (detailing manuals, guidebooks and videotapes for boundary violation training
sponsored by religious groups); cf McDaniel v. Gile, 281 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1991)
(finding attorney responsible for professional malpractice for withholding legal
services to gain sexual favors).
172. Regulation includes that of marriage, adultery, fornication, homosexual sodomy,
among others. See Posner, supra note 44; MacNamara, supra note 44.
173. Cf Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
(finding ordinance was motivated by desire to suppress religious practices of particu-
lar eligion).
174. See, e.g., Smith v. O'Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73 (D.R.I. 1997)
175. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714,
715 (1981) (holding that claims "so bizarre, so dearly nonreligious in motivation"
should be denied free exercise).
176. See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972).
177. Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1141 (D.
Mass. 1982) (citing Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d
1146, 1165 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("Although the process of sifting secular from re-
ligious claims may not be easy, Founding Church of Scientolgy v. United States found
that endeavor possible.") (citations omitted); see also Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of the
N.C. Conference of the United Methodist Church, 63 F. Supp. 2d 694, 700-01
(choosing to review the application of Title VII to church-minister employment rela-
tionship and citing Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772
F.2d 1164, 1166 (4th Cir. 1985)).
178. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997) (citing Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S.
589, 615-17 (1988)).
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There is nothing simple about sexual misconduct by clergy. The
complexity of such issues, however, does not justify the reflexive appli-
cation of the First Amendment to avoid the difficult exercise of
separating conduct from belief and the religious from the secular.
79
Too many of the courts addressing sexual abuse by clergy rely on
Lemon to refuse adjudication. It is doubtful that Lemon was ever in-
tended to be interpreted so broadly. Recent Supreme Court opinions,
Agostini v. Felton' and Mitchell v. Helms,' have narrowed Lemon and
interpreted its application as limited. Mitchell noted that Agostini "recast
[Lemon's] entanglement inquiry as simply one criterion relevant to de-
termining a statute's effect,"' making the relevant test essentially a
narrow one of purpose and effect.'83 These readings of the Establish-
ment Clause should dispel any remaining doubt that this constitutional
safeguard is not an issue in the adjudication of sexual misconduct. Ad-
judicating matters of sexual abuse by clergy "neither results in religious
indoctrination by the government nor defines its recipients by reference
to religion."
8 4
C. Sexual Harassment, Sexual Misconduct-A Comparison
Claims for sexual harassment against clerics and their institutions
have been permitted under Tide VII. The comparisons between sexual
harassment and sexual abuse or misconduct are, perhaps, obvious.
Sexual harassment is probably less well understood than sexual
abuse. Both imply a victim and a victimizer. Sexual
harassment contains the intent or threat inherent in
inappropriate sexual activity, without the explicit act, and
creates an environment that is anxiety-producing, offensive, or
hostile. Sexual abuse is an overt action of an inappropriately
179. See BisBING, supra note 73, at 279 ("The reluctance to tackle the constitutional issues
necessary to define a standard of care for clergy counseling appears to be the primary
stumbling block to successfully stating a cause of action for judicial recognition of
clergy malpractice.").
180. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
181. 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000).
182. Mitchell 120 S. Ct. at 2532 (addressing state funding of parochial schools).
183. Mitchel, 120 S. Ct. at 2532.
184. Mitchell 120 S. Ct. at 2540.
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sexual nature perpetrated by a person of superior position,
status, age, or physical power upon another.'85
Thus, judicial treatment of sexual harassment at religious institu-
tions is instructive for judicial treatment of clergy sexual abuse." 6 A
parishioner or member of the general public whom the institution serves
should be accorded at least the same protection as an employee who
works within the institution. Sexual harassment claims are "unrelated to
pastoral qualifications or issues of church doctrine," 8 7 and are therefore
unrelated to First Amendment claims of free exercise or establishment.
Nor does evaluation of sexual misconduct impinge on core religious
beliefs. "Evaluation of whether a hostile work environment exists does
not impinge on core religious beliefs such that either the free exercise of
religion is affected or there is threat of excessive government entangle-
,,188
ment.
Several federal circuit courts "exempt[] the selection of clergy from
Title VII and similar statutes and, as a consequence, precludeo civil
courts from adjudicating employment discrimination suits by ministers
185. BENvaI, supra note 1, at 60.
186. See, e.g., Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of the N.C. Conference of the United Methodist
Church, 63 F. Supp. 2d 694, 710, 717 (E.D.N.C. 1999) (holding that judicial re-
view of employee's Title VII claims does not violate the church's free exercise rights
nor does it violate the Establishment Clause); see also Joanne C. Brant, "Our Shield
Belongs to the Lord"' Religious Employers and a Constitutional Right to Discriminate, 21
HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 275, 303-09 (1994).
187. Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 721 (1991); see also Bollard v. Cal. Province of
the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he defendant church is
neither exercising its constitutionally protected prerogative to choose its ministers nor
embracing the behavior at issue as a constitutionally protected religious practice.");
Smith, 63 F. Supp. 2d 694; Himaka v. Buddhist Churches of Am., 917 F. Supp. 698
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (granting motion for summary judgment on sexual harassment
claims, while dismissing retaliation claim for excessive entanglement in violation of
the First Amendment); Nigrelli v. Catholic Bishop, No. 84C5564, 1991 WL 36712,
at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 1991) (holding that "there was no doubt that.., the court
need not inquire into the doctrines and religious goals of the Catholic Church [or] of
the [parochial] school" to determine whether the plaintiff was sexually harassed by
her immediate supervisor, pastor of the parish). But see Van Osdol v. Vogt, 908 P.2d
1122 (Colo. 1996) (en banc) (holding that the First Amendment precludes Title VII
claims).
188. Van Osdol, 908 P.2d at 1135 (Mullarkey, J., concurring); see also Black v. Snyder,
471 N.W.2d 715, 720-21 (Minn. App. 1991) (finding that the minister's "sexual
harassment claim [was] unrelated to pastoral qualifications or issues of church doc-
trine").
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against the church or religious institution employing them."'8 9 Consis-
tent with pre-Tide VII constitutional interpretations, suits in which
ministers or those performing ministerial functions challenge the em-
ployment decisions of religious institutions are barred by the First
Amendment.'9 Even under Title VII, employment decisions continue
to be part of church governance, not for review by secular courts.'' This
does not, however, preclude review of sexual harassment claims.
In addition, courts have applied this rule to claims brought by lay
employees of religious institutions whose "primary duties consist of
teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a relig-
ious order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and
worship,"' 92 but not where the employees do not perform essentially
religious functions.'9 The second application of this rule demonstrates
that the exception is not based on status, but rather on the function or
conduct of the individual. For consistency, if we do not permit lay em-
ployees who perform religious functions to sue for discrimination, we
189. EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also
McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972); Rayburn v. Gen. Con-
ference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985), Minker v.
Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (dismissing age discrimination case); Powell v. Stafford, 859 F. Supp.
1343 (D. Col. 1994) (dismissing claim under ADEA against catholic high school);
Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991)
(dismissing age and gender discrimination claims against church-affiliated hospital).
190. Cases supporting the "church-minister" or "ministerial" exception include Combs v.
Central Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343
(5th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 48 F. Supp. 2d 505 (E.D.N.C.
1999) (finding that ministerial exception applies to minister's sex discrimination
claim); Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455; Young v. N. Ill. Conference of United Method-
ist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 1972); Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal
Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991); Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169; Bell
v. Presbyterian Church, 126 F.3d 328, 331 (4th Cir. 1997); McClure v. Salvation
Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the
Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
191. See Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116 (stating that the Free Exercise Clause protects the ability
of religious organizations "to decide for themselves, free from state interference, mat-
ters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine"); Kreshik v. Saint
Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 363 U.S. 190, 191 (1960).
192. Smith, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 704; see abo Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169; Catholic Univ., 83
F.3d at 463; Young, 21 F.3d at 186.
193. See, e.g., EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1370 (9th Cit. 1982)
("[D]uties of the teachers at [the school] do not filfill the function of a minister.");
EEOC v. Pacific Press Publ'g Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1278 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[A]n
editorial secretary... did not fulfill the function of a minister, nor was her employ-
ment at the Press the type of critically sensitive position within the church that
McClure sought to protect.").
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should not permit ministers to avoid suit for conduct of general prohi-
bition,194 especially sexual abuse.
In the final analysis, courts considering claims for sexual harass-
ment "cannot agree that [they] are required to defer to religious
authority in resolving [such] claims where no issue of doctrinal contro-
versy is involved and where the dispute between the parties is not
ecclesiastical." 9 5 In addition, "mere 'hypothetical concerns,' and the
'bare potential' that an employment discrimination inquiry would im-
pact religious beliefs 'does not warrant precluding the application' of the
law to religious employers." 19 6 The same should be true for claims al-
leging sexual misconduct, whether as malpractice or as breach of
fiduciary duty. 97 The statutory prohibition of Title VII should not be
considered more neutral than that of the common law.198 Sexual mis-
conduct does not involve ecclesiastical matters, and suggestions that
courts would become embroiled in church doctrine by examining such
conduct are erroneous.
194. Cf Smith, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 709-10 ("[Clourts that have exercised and declined
jurisdiction over Title VII cases involving religious institutions have based their re-
spective decisions on the degree to which resolving the issues raised by a plaintiffs
claims would require intrusion into the spiritual functions of the religious institution
at issue."); Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1171 ("Of course churches are not-and should not
be-above the law. Like any other person or organization, they may be held liable for
their torts and upon their valid contracts. Their employment decisions may be sub-
ject to Tide VII scrutiny, where the decision does not involve the church's spiritual
functions.").
195. Smith, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 715 (citing Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 605 (1979); Gen.
Council on Fin. & Adm'n of the United Methodist Church v. Superior Ct. of Cal.,
439 U.S. 1355, 1373 (1978); Bell, 126 F.3d at 331; see also Sanders v. Casa View
Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 335-36 (5th Cir. 1998):
The First Amendment does not categorically insulate religious relationships
from judicial scrutiny, for to do so would necessarily extend constitutional
protection to the secular components of these religious relationships....
Instead the Free Exercise Clause protects religious relationships... pri-
marily by preventing the judicial resolution of ecclesiastical disputes
turning on matters of "religious doctrine or practice."
196. Starkman v. Evans, 18 F. Supp. 2d 630, 633 (E.D. La. 1998) (quoting EEOC v.
Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 487 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that ADA claim by minister
not automatically in violation of establishment clause).
197. See supra Part I.
198. This is so in part because statutes are generally founded on principle substantially
formed through the common law, and in part because Tide VII was intended to sup-
plement other causes of action, not supercede them. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
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differential in sexual misconduct is comparable to that in rape or do-
mestic abuse.0 6 Indeed, clergy sexual abuse is not about sex per se, but
rather about power and control.2 7 The outcomes in these situations are
also analogous in that blame tends to be placed upon the victim.
-01
These situations are tacitly accepted and permitted to continue by the
silence.29 Nonetheless, the emotional toll is imposed not only on the
relative or minister) and a person who is vulnerable to and trusting of that
power (a child or counselee). Victims often feel responsible for the abuser's
activity and so are bound in secrecy by a double burden of guilt and shame.
Even if the victim does speak up, she or he may not be believed.
206. See generally Cooper-White, supra note 7 (comparing the power dynamics in pastoral
sexual abuse to that in rape and domestic abuse). Also note the Center for the Pre-
vention of Sexual and Domestic Violence has been addressing the issue of sexual
abuse by clergy since 1983. See Fortune, supra note 92, at 34.
Victim-blaming and the misconceptions about the continuation of the sexual
abuse (i.e., "why didn't you just leave") is also comparable to the dynamic surround-
ing domestic abuse. See Penfold, supra note 9, at 244-45. Such breaches in trust
might especially be likened to the emotional and psychological harm precipitated by
marital rape. See also supra note 8.
207. See Cooper-White, supra note 7, at 196 ("As with rape, a pastor's sexual or romantic
involvement with a parishioner is not primarily a matter of sex or sexuality but of
power and control.").
208. BENY E, supra note 1, at 85-100 (discussing scapegoating within the situation or
community); Penfold, supra note 9, at 245 ("Our society has a long tradition of vic-
tim-blaming which allows us to attribute responsibility to, ignore, or distance
ourselves from victims.") (citation omitted); see generally Fortune, supra note 45, at
81-83; Villiers, supra note 7, at 8; Cooper-White, supra note 7, at 199 (noting how
women are blamed for their own sexual abuse in much the same way they are blamed
for their own rapes, their own physical abuse or blamed for raising the abusive son).
209. See BENYE, supra note 1, at 101-19; BIsBING, supra note 73, at 254-55; Morey,
supra note 7, at 866; cf. Zanita E. Fenton, Mirrored Silence: Reflections on Judicial
Complicity in Private Violence, 78 OR. L. REv. 995 (1999) (discussing the ways in
which the victims of domestic abuse are silenced, compounding the violence inflicted
upon them).
This is not unlike how external situations of abuse are treated within religious
institutions. See, e.g., Cooper-White, supra note 7, at 196; Marie M. Fortune, Be-
trayal of the Pastoral Relationship: Sexual Contact By Pastors and Pastoral Counselors, in
PSYCHOTHERPISTS' SEXUAL INVOLVEMENT AND PREVENTION 81, 82 (Gary Richard
Schoener et al. eds., 1989); Puttick, supra note 45, at 103-06 (discussing the misog-
yny inherent in most religions); Villiers, supra note 7, at 4; see also Schoener, supra
note 70, at 16-17 ("It seems that a certain critical level of visibility is necessary before
either the profession itself or the community attempts to intervene in a major fashion
to prevent or remedy sexual misconduct with clients.... We have tried.., self-
regulation in concert with ethics-and it has not solved the problem.... Now it is
time for new initiatives.").
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D. Families and Faith
While religious communities are indeed communities, ' they are
not independent or self-contained. They are also part of larger commu-
nities and society. "Even beyond being a community, congregations
most often see themselves as a family, which is a particular sort of com-
munity."211 It is not uncommon for these communities to be referred to
as "families of faith. 20 Families are imperfect. Religious communities
are also imperfect. The analogy is further supported by the different
spheres in which we consider various conduct, likening church activity
to conduct in the private sphere. Conceptually, freedom of association
and belief are principally private matters.2°' To the extent we accept this
analogy, sexual misconduct between clergy and congregant is obviously
malevolent.
The emotional and psychological harm is easily likened to that pre-
cipitated by breaches of trust between family members. 2° A comparison
of such conduct to incest is not uncommon.25 The abuse of the power
199. "Churches and other religious organizations are among the mediating structures in a
culture, occupying the space between the individual and government, and serving as
loci of responsibility, commitment, and identity for many people." Esbeck, supra
note 11, at 11 (citing P. BERGER & R. NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE
OF MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC PoLcY 1-8 (1977)).
200. BENYEI, supra note 1, at 12 (includes discussion of family system analogy, loyalty,
patterns of power relationships, marriage metaphor, and tendencies to toleration of
abuse); see also Cooper-White, supra note 7, at 196.
201. See, e.g., FORTUNE, supra note 45, at 87. This analogy is supported further by the
common use of "brother," "sister" and especially "father" within many religious
communities.
202. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 123, at 1311-12 (depicting certain associations as
"private" in character, including religious affiliations); see also text accompanying
notes 211-216.
203. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 123, at 1311-12 (placing associations that constitute
communities (like religious associations) in the private sphere).
204. See BISBING, supra note 73, at 272-73; MARIE FORTUNE, KEEPING THE FMATH:
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOR THE ABUSED WoMAN 45 (1987).
205. See, e.g., Villiers, supra note 7, at 8-10; see also BISBING, supra note 73, at 267; Ellen
T. Luepker, Sexual Exploitation of Clients by Therapists: Parallels with Parent-Child In-
cest, in PSYCHOTHERAPISTS' SEXUAL INVOLVEMENT WITH CLIENTS 73 (Gary Richard
Schoener et al. eds., 1989); Penfold, supra note 9, at 244 ("Because of the parent-like
dimensions of the professional's relationship with the client, sexual abuse of an adult
has some parallels with incest and may have severe and long-lasting effects."); Morey,
supra note 7, at 866:
Sexual abuse by pastors exhibits the same dynamic as incestuous abuse,
which takes place within the context of an intimate relationship (family,
church, counseling) between an authoritative and powerful person (a
20011
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survivor of the abuse, but it also has a profound effect on the congrega-
tion as a community.
210
Judicial treatment of religion mirrors in many ways the historical
treatment of the family. Ideologically, the institution of family was re-
garded as part of the private sphere, a domain into which the state
should not interfere. 21 Thus, the doctrine of familial privacy, or the
non-intervention model, of dealing with family matters was the pre-
ferred approach. Criticism of a husband's right to physically "chastise"
his wife was traditionally discounted in ways that protected male power,
permitting violence against women in the home.213 Comparatively, re-
ligion is an area in which the state should not interfere. 4 In addition,
women's experiences in the church, the scant attention to their concerns
and their general role within church structures combine to form an en-
vironment where clergy sexual misconduct can flourish.215 Despite this
ideological bulwark respecting family matters, it has gradually been rec-
ognized that there are indeed areas where intervention by the state is
appropriate, and even necessary, meaning that treatment of family has
.... 216
evolved to include an interventionist model. Given many of the sexual
210. See generally Nancy Myer Hopkins, The Uses and Limitations of Various Models for
Understanding Clergy Sexual Misconduct: The Impact on the Congregation, 24 J. SEX
EDUC. & THERAPY 268 (1999).
211. See Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Re-
form, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1497, 1498-1504 (1983).
212. See Olsen, supra note 211; Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23
CoNN. L. REv. 973, 976 (1991) ("The law claims to be absent in the private sphere
and has historically refused to intervene in ongoing family relations."); see also Martha
Minow, Beyond State Intervention in the Family: For Baby Jane Doe, 18 U. MICH. J.L.
REFoasM 933, 951-53 (pointing out that the dichotomy between intervention and
non-intervention is a false one and that outcomes are a matter of state choices).
213. Reva B. Siegle, "The Rule of Love" Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE
L.J. 2117, 2123 (1996) (demonstrating inertia allowed continued family violence
through deference to privacy).
214. See, e.g., Teadt v. Lutheran Church Mo. Synod, 603 N.W.2d 816, 823 (Mich. App.
1999) ("[We hesitate to allow a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty in the
context of interpersonal relationships.").
215. Villiers, supra note 7, at 5 ("The patriarchal structure of the church plays a key role in
the problem of the failure to recognize clergy misconduct as a viable cause [of] action,
because patriarchal views are integrated in the legal process, to the detriment of
women.").
216. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 212, at 983-85. Child protection and general health
and safety are also reasons for state intervention. At the conjunction of family and
religion, courts have been resistant to criminal prosecution of faith-healers for non-
use of contemporary medicine to help their children. See generally Jennifer L. Rosato,
Putting Square Pegs in a Round Hole: Procedural Due Process and Effect of Faith
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misconduct cases discussed thus far, it is apparent that courts prefer not
to "interfere" with or even protect and support the personal rights of
women. This discussion is intended to help courts change their treat-
ment of sexual abuse within religious contexts. It is time for courts to
recognize in more meaningfiul ways that the First Amendment does not
protect religious adherents against social wrongs.
E. Breach ofFiduciary Duty-A Neutral Application
Despite the standards of care inherent in negligence, it is still pos-
sible to apply tort doctrine in a neutral manner.217 The court in F.G. v.
MacDonel215 found that breach of fiduciary duty was a neutral principle
of law that is capable of being applied without implicating religious
doctrine. 9 Indeed, the requisite standard of care in breach of fiduciary
duty is neither general nor dependent upon the specifics of any religion
or its practices, 220 but is a standard specific to the relationship.22' That
Healing Exemptions on the Prosecution of Faith Healing Parents, 29 U.S.F. L. Rav. 43
(1994); supra note 150.
217. See supra pp. 57-59.
218. 696A.2d 697, 702 (NJ. 1997).
219. F.G., 696 A.2d at 702; see also Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 323 (Colo.
1993); Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383, 386 (Or. Ct. App. 1989); Lightman
v. Flaum, 687 N.Y.S.2d 562 (Sup. Ct. 1999) (using neutral principles of law to sus-
tain a claim for breach of fiduciary duty by congregant against rabbis).
220. Doe v. Hartz, 52 F. Supp. 1027, 1061 (N.D. Iowa 1999) ("[A] fiduciary duty is not
imposed according to 'professional standards' of any profession or vocation. It is in-
stead imposed by circumstances in which one party 'is under a duty to act for or to
give advice for the benefit of another upon matters within the scope of the relation-
ship."') (quoting Oeltjenbrun v. CSA Inv., Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1053 (N.D.
Iowa 1998)); Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138, 1151 (E.D. Mich.
1995) (stating that negligent supervision claim not barred by First Amendment be-
cause "'neutral' principles of law can be applied without determining underlying
questions of church law and policies"); Moses, 863 P.2d at 320-21 (stating that First
Amendment does not bar claims for negligent hiring or supervision or breach of fidu-
ciary duty because deciding such claims does "not require interpreting or weighing
church doctrine and neutral principles of law can be applied"); c. Smith v.
O'Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 81 (D.R.I. 1997) ("[The plaintiffs' core claim, namely,
that the hierarchy defendants failed to take appropriate action to prevent the alleged
sexual assaults, is governed by neutral tort law principles of general application.").
221. Doe, 52 F. Supp. at 1061-62 ("Thus, whether a fiduciary relationship exists depends
upon factual circumstances, not upon professional standards of conduct for the aver-
age reasonable member of the clergy.") (citing Doe v. Evans, 718 So. 2d 286, 291
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)); F.G., 696 A.2d at 702-04; Moses, 863 P.2d at 321 n.13;
see also Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 284 (Colo. 1988). Existence of duty is
[Vol. 8:45
FAITH IN JUSTICE
the relationship is one that involves an authority or adherent of a relig-
ion is relevant only to the nature of the power differential in establishing
the fiduciary character of the relationship. The counseling relationship
and any power differential is the basis for understanding the kind of
harm these torts address.
Courts need not evaluate the beliefs and practices of the fiduciary
or his employer to determine if there has been a breach of trust in the
relationship. Regardless of what the church claims are its canonical
standards for the proper behavior of priests, the civil law can say that
sexual seduction of a counselee is not even "arguably religious," that it is
wrongful and thus punishable in tort.222 Even were it part of church
doctrine, it could still be adjudicated under Employment Division v.
Smith.z
The fiduciary relationship in the context of clergy sexual miscon-
duct can be established in two ways: the counselor/counselee
relationship or the clergy/congregant relationship. The former should be
the focus with the latter being an important qualifier,224 as the existence
of the counseling relationship with the cleric is enough to establish the
fiduciary relationship. 225 The clergy/congregant relationship should be a
qualifier because of the expectations created by the position that should
operate in a manner analogous to equitable estoppel. In general, priests
hold themselves out to be "asexual." Consulting a clergyman is viewed
€ r .1 226
as safe," like seeking advice from a brother or father. The latter
a question of law, while its breach is one of fact. See Sanders v. Casa View Baptist
Church, 898 F. Supp. 1169, 1175 (N.D. Tex. 1995).
222. Esbeck, supra note 11, at 87.
223. 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see also supra Part LA.
224. Villiers, supra note 7, at 9 ("Trust in a clergy member makes the parishioner more
vulnerable and less likely to report the wrongdoer.").
225. See Sanders, 898 F. Supp. at 1176 ("[The cleric's] duty would be created by his un-
dertaking to counsel them."); F.G., 696 A.2d at 704 ("Establishing a fiduciary duty
essentially requires proof that a parishioner trusted and sought counseling from the
pastor. A violation of that trust constitutes a breach of the duty."); Erickson v.
Christenson, 781 P.2d 383, 386 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) ("[Pllaintiffs claim... is not
premised on the mere fact that Christenson is a pastor, but on the fact that, because
he was plaintffs pastor and counselor, a special relationship of trust and confidence
developed.").
226. See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text (discussing analogy of family to re-
ligious community); cf 61 Am. Jur. 2d Physicians, Surgeons, etc. § 202 (1981) ("The
duty of a physician or surgeon to bring skill and care to the amelioration of the con-
dition of his patient does not arise from contract, but has its foundation in public
considerations which are inseparable from the nature and exercise of his calling; it is
predicated by the law on the relation which exists between physician and patient,
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227
should generally not be the focus of state concerns, as it is wholly pos-
sible that a priest and parishioner may have a truly consensual sexual
relationship.228 However, with the clergy/congregant relationship, there
is still an imbalance of power, and it is imaginable that there might be
breaches of trust within group situations and to multiple parties.229 Be-
cause breach of fiduciary duty is relationship specific, understanding it
as the appropriate cause of action eliminates the need to distinguish
between religions. The religion itself need not condemn the conduct for
the abuse of power to be demonstrated within the relationship.
The preceding might be characterized as a "bright-line" approach.
First, establish the existence of a counseling relationship with the
cleric.230 If the relationship is one that became sexual during the course
of counseling,23' there has been a breach. Breach is taking advantage of
the power differential for personal gratification. Once the plaintiff
establishes the fiduciary relationship, there should be a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the cleric, in the dominant position in the relationship, is
which... is the result of a consensual transaction ... and the existence of which is a
question of fact.") (emphasis added).
227. See Doe v. Hartz, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1060 (N.D. Iowa 1999) (pointing out that
more than just the relationship is required; some form of confidence or trust must be
reposed).
228. See, e.g., Strock v. Presnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1243 (Ohio 1988) (refusing to apply
breach of fiduciary duty to a consensual sexual relationship); Hertel v. Sullivan, 633
N.E.2d 36 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); see also, Karen Lebacqz, Pastor-Parishioner Sexuality:
An EthicalAnalysis, EXPLOR. (Spring 1998) (arguing that it may be legitimate for sin-
gle pastors to fall in love with single parishioners, while still cautioning of the
complex power dynamic involved).
229. It is easy to imagine the traditional, mainstream religions making proposals for pre-
vention. However, alternative situations should not be dismissed. The history of
religion in America has witnessed religions organized in ways quite different from the
traditional. We often label these organizations "cults."
230. See, e.g., Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 321 (Colo. 1993); see also Flanni-
gan, supra note 66, at 321 (proposing a three part analysis of fiduciary relationships,
the first of which is to ask whether or not a trusting relationship existed).
231. This should include sexual abuse in places other than in the place of counsel as it is
hard to delineate the relationship and the exploitation. In addition, any truly consen-
sual relationship would not commence until the counseling relationship has been
properly terminated. See generally BISBING, supra note 73, at 727-62.
232. See Morey, supra note 7, at 869 ("The professional is always responsible; sex with a
client is never okay.") (citing Sex, Power, and the Family of God, Christianity and Cri-
sis, February 16, 1987, at 47). See also Flannigan, supra note 66, at 321 (proposing a
three part analysis of fiduciary relationships, the second of which is to ask whether
what the person did was inconsistent with the maintenance of the trusting relation-
ship).
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responsible.23 Thus, in both Teadt34 and Langford,23' a jury should have
been permitted to evaluate evidence of the relationship and the alleged
breach of trust.
F. Institutional Liabiliy
Up to this point, this article has focused on the individual liability
of the cleric for his own actions. An essential point to consider is from
where the responsibility of the religious organization should arise. One
of the goals of tort law must be to place responsibility where the harm
can best be prevented. To the extent religious institutions have the abil-
ity to control or guide its clerics within its institutional setting, it should
do so and be accountable. "The protection of society requires that re-
ligious organizations be held accountable for injuries they cause to third
,,236persons.
As with the other areas of "clergy malpractice," courts are not uni-
form in whether sexual misconduct by a cleric within the context of an
233. Cf Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409, 417,
423, 428 (2d Cir. 1999) (indicating that once a fiduciary relationship is established,
the burden would shift to the fiduciary to prove non-breach); In re Hartelrodes's
Will, 148 N.W. 774, 777 (Mich. 1914):
There are certain cases in which the law indulges in the presumption that
undue influence has been used, as where a patient makes a will in favor of
his physician, a client in favor of his lawyer, or a sick person in favor of a
priest or spiritual adviser, whether for his own personal advantage, or for
the advantage of some interest which he is a representative.
Guill v. Wolpert, 218 N.W.2d 224, 234 (Neb. 1974) (stating that once the fiduciary
relationship is established by plaintiff, the defendant has "the burden of going for-
ward with the evidence to show that it is not tainted with undue influence") (citing
Conry v. Langdon, 146 N.W.2d 782 (Neb. 1966)); Ross v. Conway, 92 Cal. 632,
635 (Cal. 1892) ("[ln every such transaction between persons standing in [a fiduci-
ary relationship] the law will presume that he who held an influence over the other
exercised it unduly to his own advantage."); Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr.
422, 432 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1983) ("If such a [confidential] relationship were estab-
lished, respondent would then have the burden of proving that the consent was
informed and freely given.., or, in the alternative, that her reliance was unjusti-
fied.").
234. Teadt v. Lutheran Church Mo. Synod, 603 N.W.2d 816, 822 (Mich. App. 1999).
235. Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 705 N.Y.S.2d 661 (App. Div. 2000).
236. Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450, 456 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); see also Doe v. Hartz,
52 F. Supp. 1027, 1073 (N.D. Iowa 1999) (reading Godar as sufficient support for
negligent supervision claim, noting that "because of [his] employment [as a priest], an
employee may pose a threat of injury to members of the public") (citing Godar v.
Edwards, 588 N.W.2d 701, 709 (Iowa 1999)).
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institutionally-sponsored counseling relationship is something for which
the institution can be held responsible. Most courts categorically hold
that sexual activity is purely personal and does not advance the purposes
of the institution in any way that would allow respondeat superior to be
imposed:237 "When a priest has sexual intercourse with a parishioner it is
not part of the priest's duties nor customary within the business of the
church. ,,a
38
The rationale behind this position is a point of major inconsistency
in some cases and in this overall area. Some of the same courts that as-
sert sexual misconduct is not part of church business, and is therefore
outside the scope of the priest's ministerial duties, nonetheless refuse to
impose responsibility on the cleric because there would be an impermis-
sible inquiry into beliefs and practices of his religion.239 Other courts
refuse to impose liability on the cleric for impermissible inquiry into
religious practice, and then also do not hold the institution responsible
for something for which the individual will not be held responsible,
even where there is direct knowledge of such conduct imputed to the
institution.4 °
As in the case of tort responsibility of clerics for sexual misconduct,
the responsibility of the religious institution can be evaluated without
237. Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 330 (Colo. 1993) (en banc); Destefano v.
Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 287 (Colo. 1988) (en banc); Tichenor v. Roman Catholic
Church of the Archdiocese, 32 F.3d 953, 959 (5th Cir. 1994); Fearing v. Bucher,
936 P.2d 1023, 1026 (Or. Ct. App. 1997); Konkle, 672 N.E.2d at 456; Dausch v.
Ryske, 52 F.3d 1425, 1428 (7th Cir. 1994) ("mhe church defendants could not be
held vicariously liable for actions done by Rykse solely for his own benefit and not as
part of his ministerial duties."); Teadt, 603 N.W.2d at 818 (pointing out that clerics'
sexual conduct was in no way "related to or condoned by church doctrine").
Resistance to imposition of respondeat superior has also been encountered in
other counseling relationships. See Cosgrove v. Lawrence, 520 A.2d 844, 847 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1986) (stating that sexual relations with a client were never in-
tended to be part of social work therapy); Andrews v. United States, 732 F.2d 366,
370 (4th Cir. 1984) (stating that physician's assistant's sexual relationship with pa-
tient based on assurance of its therapeutic value was found to further only employee's
interests and therefore could not be basis for vicarious liability). But see Simmons v.
United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that social worker's sex-
ual contact with patient falls within scope of employment).
238. Destefano, 763 P.2d at 287.
239. See, e.g., Dausch 52 F.3d at 1428; H.RB. v. J.L.G., 913 S.W.2d 92, 97, 98 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1995).
Ironically, courts have determined that any sexual misconduct is generally out-
side the scope of employment. Is this not also an evaluation of religious belief by the
court's or an imposition of one individual's?
240. See Teadt, 603 N.W.2d at 824.
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inquiry into religious practice or belief.24 If such conduct is known or
knowable, or if ratification has been made, the institution should be
accountable. 242 Again, comparing the application of Title VII to em-
ployment discrimination, the standard for responsibility is knowledge
through use of formal complaint structures or actual knowledge.243 Just
as fiduciary relations should not be premised on the clergy/parishioner
relationship alone, but primarily on the counseling relationship, institu-• / 244 r/
tional responsibility should not be premised on its status alone. They
should be held responsible for their own conduct (or failure to act)
through theories of direct responsibility, based on the knowledge of the
institution,2 45 even if responsibility is not imposed on theories of agency
241. See supra Parts I.A and I.B.
242. See, e.g., Moses, 863 P.2d at 321-23 (basing liability on institution's own actions and
knowledge); Destefano, 763 P.2d at 287-88 ("[T]he master may subject himself to li-
ability ... by retaining in his employment servants who, to his knowledge, are in the
habit of misconducting themselves in a manner dangerous to others.") (citing Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 317, cmt. c (1965)); Debose v. Bear Valley Church of
Christ, 890 P.2d 214, 230 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) ("An employer may ratify the un-
authorized act of its employee, i.e., an act not within the scope of employment, and
thereby become obligated to the same extent as if the principal had originally
authorized the act.") (citations omitted).
243. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70-72 (1986).
244. See infra note 249. But see Bishop v. Schmidt, 779 F. Supp. 321, 327 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) ("Respondeat superior is founded on agency, and the agency relationship, if
there were any, was that of pastor, or clergy.")
245. See Moses, 863 P.2d at 323-29 (finding negligent hiring and supervision when Dio-
cese had specific knowledge of harmful behavior but took no action to remedy); Jones
v. Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927, 932 (1992):
mhat a religious body must be held free from any responsibility for
wholly predictable and foreseeable injurious consequences of personnel de-
cisions, although such decisions incorporate no theological or dogmatic
tenets-would go beyond First Amendment protection and cloak such
bodies with an exclusive immunity greater than that required for the pres-
ervation of the principles constitutionally safeguarded.
See also Faragher v. City of Boca, 524 U.S. 775, 807-09 (1998); Dees v. Johnson
Controls World Servs. Inc., 168 F.3d 417, 421 (1 1th Cir. 1999) (holding that under
theory of direct liability "[t]he harassment can be ascribed to the employer's negli-
gence when the employer knev or should have known about the harassment and
failed to take remedial action"); Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1369
(9th Cir. 1986) (stating that counselor's supervisor knew of sexual contact, but took
no action regarding it); Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of the N.C. Conference of the United
Methodist Church, 63 F. Supp. 2d 694, 710 (E.D.N.C. 1999) ("An employer is
negligent with respect to sexual harassment if it knew or should have known about
the conduct but failed to stop it. Negligence sets a minimum standard for employer
liability under Title VII.") (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742
(1998)); Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409,
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or respondeat superior.246 An institution that commissions or condones
counseling activities by its clerics should also supervise such activities.
Though it may not be one of the sanctioned activities, sexual miscon-
duct is foreseeable in a counseling relationship and may be prevented
through proper supervision.247
CONCLUSION
Sexual predators, while also in the general population, should not
be granted refuge by mere affiliation with religious institutions. To the
extent that our government is charged with governing society, and re-
ligious congregations are part of society, those congregations should
benefit from the protections of the state and be subject to its prohibi-
tions. 24'
Common law prohibitions of sexual misconduct by fiduciaries and
professionals should be considered a generally applicable law. Excep-
tions for religious institutions counter common sense and social
expectations imbedded in the fiduciary/professional relationship. Any
427 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding institution liable for knowledge of pattern of abuse and
potential for harm to others); Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 248 (Mo. 1997)
(en banc); Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 590 (Ohio 1991) ("[E]ven the most lib-
eral construction of the First Amendment will not protect a religious organization's
decision to hire someone who it knows is likely to commit criminal or tortious
acts.").
246. It is possible to interpret the doctrine of respondeat superior in a way that such con-
duct would be the responsibility of the employer. Once the counseling function is
authorized or allowed, mishandling of transference and sexual abuse is foreseeable. See
supra notes 95-98. If the action is foreseeable within the scope of responsibilities,
then it ought to be considered within the scope of employment and actionable. See,
e.g., Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383, 386-87 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (indicating
that foreseeability of harm is an important aspect of institutional liability).
When the servant is doing or attempting to do the very thing which he was
directed to do, the master is liable, though the servant's method of doing it
be wholly unauthorized or forbidden .... That the servant disobeyed the
orders of the master is never a sufficient defense. It must be shown further
that he ceased to act for the master and in the course of his employment.
Mullen v. Horton, 700 A.2d 1377, 1380 (Conn. App. 1997) (citing Son v. Hartford
Ice Cream Co., 129 A. 778 (Conn. 1925)); see also Erickson, 781 P.2d at 386 n.3
("Because the alleged wrongful act was improper performance of pastoral counseling
duties, whether it occurred within the scope of employment is a factual issue.").
247. See Nancy A. Bridges, The Role of Supervision in Managing Intense Affect and Con-
structing Boundaries in Therapeutic Relationships, 24 J. SEx EDUC. & THERAPY 218
(1999) (suggesting supervisory models to prevent boundary violations).
248. See BErN'i, supra note 1, at 145-66.
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such exception would allow the First Amendment to be used as a pre-
textual shield to protect otherwise prohibited conduct.249
At the least, courts should grant these plaintiffs the access and op-
portunity to demonstrate their claim. 250  Even without the First
Amendment barriers constructed by the courts, these types of actions
against fiduciaries are in a state of evolution25 and are very difficult in
any context. 2  Proof and the meeting of standards and statutes of limi-
tation, independent of the church and state issues, remain complex and
difficult. Cases not within religious contexts are regularly dismissed.253
249. See Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360, 363 n.3 (8th
Cir. 1991); see also F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 702 (NJ. 1997) ("The First
Amendment does not insulate a member of the clergy from actions for breach of fi-
duciary duty arising out of sexual misconduct that occurs during a time when the
clergy member is providing counseling to a parishioner."); Destefano v. Grabrian,
763 P.2d 275, 284 (Colo. 1988) ("Members of the clergy cannot, in all circum-
stances, use the shield of the first amendment as protection and as a basis for
immunity from civil suit."); Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 705 N.Y.S.2d
661, 663 (App. Div. 2000) (Miller, J., dissenting) ("[Any attempt to define the duty
of care owed by a member of the clergy to a parishioner fosters 'excessive entangle-
ment with religion'... [and] will establish appellate precedent shielding from civil
judicial examination even the most flagrant clerical misconduct perpetuated upon
vulnerable parishioners, children as well as adults."). The Supreme Court in Reynolds
makes perhaps the most appropriate statement: to disallow the claims of breach of fi-
duciaty duty for sexual misconduct "would be to make the professed doctrines of
religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to
become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such cir-
cumstances." Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879).
250. See Doe v. Hartz, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1062 (N.D. Iowa 1999) ("[This court can-
not find that breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims against members of the clergy are barred
ab initio. Rather, the question ... is whether facts giving rise to a fiduciary relation-
ship and consequent duties have been alleged."); Van Schaick v. Church of
Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1135 (D. Mass. 1982) ("Causes of ac-
tion based upon some proscribed conduct may, thus, withstand a motion to dismiss
even if the alleged wrongdoer acts upon a religious belief or is organized for a relig-
ious purpose."); Lanfyord, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 663 (Miller, J., dissenting) ("Clearly no
examination of church doctrine is required in order for the plaintiff's claims against
her priest to be heard.").
251. See BISBING, supra note 73, at 32 ("Courts ... are more hesitant to apply fiduciary
principals to physicians' and attorneys' personal dealings (sex), even when evidence of
injustice has been presented.").
252. In other professional contexts, successful causes of action are difficult. See generally
BISBING, supra note 73; see also BISBING, supra note 73, at 32. Because of the power
imbalance, professionals should not be permitted to prey upon their clients/patients.
The case for holding clergy responsible for sexual misconduct is even more compel-
ling as a counseling relationship is often involved.
253. See, e.g., Jennings v. Friedman, No. 88-6046, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 7352, at *5 (6th
Cir. May 25, 1989) ('The critical inquiry... [is] whether a physician engaged in sexual
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Even when the counselor is a psychologist, it is not easy to evaluate such
claims. Only since 1975 have such causes of action been recognized as
against a psychiatrist,254 with other areas to follow later still. 255 But for
the misapplication of First Amendment law, the focus of this article
might otherwise have been to demonstrate the reasons why the use of
fiduciary law to prevent such sexual exploitation and wrongs is so neces-
sary.
There are concerns that allowing this cause of action, whether de-
livered as clergy malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty, will suddenly
open the flood gates to other intrusions upon religion;256 these concerns
are empty. However, concerns of deep-pocket targeting may be war-
ranted, but unavoidable. The history of allowing these causes of action
demonstrates that this and any other cause of action in the future will be
staunchly circumscribed. Nonetheless, this article only addresses sexual
misconduct within a counseling relationship. Admittedly, other areas
may follow from the analyses in this article, but only where it makes
sense and there is a secular justification. 25 t
relations with a patient under the guise of rendering professional services."); Atienza v.
Taub, 239 Cal. Rptr. 454, 457 (Ct. App. 1987) (finding unhappy affair insufficient to
make out cause of action for professional negligence); Jacobsen v. Muller, 352 S.E.2d
604, 607 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming dismissal of professional malpractice claim
against job counselor for sexual misconduct); Suppressed v. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d
101, 106 (Ii. App. Ct. 1990) (declining to apply fiduciary principles to an attorney's
personal dealings with a client); Odegard v. Finne, 500 N.W.2d 140, 143 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1993) (applying the reasoning of Atienza to a claim of medical malpractice based
on a failed romantic relationship).
254. Roy v. Hartogs, 366 N.Y.S.2d 297, 298 (Civ. Ct. 1975) (addressing allegations that a
psychiatrist convinced his patient to have sex with him as a necessary part of treatment).
255. See, e.g., Horak v. Bidis, 474 N.E.2d 13, 17 (II1. App. Ct. 1985) (recognizing cause of
action for malpractice against social worker who had sexual relations with wife of couple
who had come to him for marital counseling); Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal Rptr.
422, 426-27 (Ct. App. 1983) (recognizing cause of action for deceit and battery against
attorney who impregnated client after representing such occurrence as an impossibility).
256. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321,328 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
257. See generally O'Reilly & Strasser, supra note 11. Unfortunately, this drawback is one
general to the legal system.
258. Use of personal information to commit fraud or abuse of funds are obvious examples.
See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 95 (1994) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(suggesting the hypothetical scenario of false representation by a charlatan to raise funds
for the construction of a church but diverts donation to personal use); see also EsBECK,
supra note 11, at 33.
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